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PROFESSIONAL PEER REVIEW
AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS
Cark C. Havighurst*
ProfessorHavighurstexhaustively explores the antitrustimplicationsoffee, utilization, and quality-orientedpeer review. He places such activity first in a theoretical
context andthen in an historicalcontext that shows why peer review merits particular
antitrustattention. He suggests that defending peer review on the same public-interest grounds as are used in defense of the actions ofpublic regulatorybodies is conceptually mistaken. A more appropriate defense, he says, would be that properly
conductedpeer review-which eschews coercion,performs an advisoryfunction, and
leaves to others the decision whether to act on its advice-actuallyenhances competition in the consumer's interest. Contrary to numerous contemporarycommentators,
he arguesthat special antitrustexemptionsfor peer-review bodies are not only unnecessary, but would be counterproductiveto the continued evolution of sound antitrust
principles. ProfessorHavighurstaddresses the effects ofpeer review on both its professionalsponsors andthirdparties He concludes that when it does not adversely affect
competition among its sponsorspeer-review activity should be subject to only minimal
judicialscrutiny. Such a result would reinforce the notion that antitrust law should
protect competition, not competito

INTRODUCTION

° PHYSICIANS, PEER review-oversight of the practices of
an individual doctor by fellow professionals--exemplifies their
professionalism and their "selflessness and devotion to patient
care." 1 Believing that they have a collective responsibility as a profession to maintain the quality and contain the cost of medical care,
physicians are understandably resentful when their efforts in these
directions are challenged in court. They are particularly offended
by antitrust suits, which they perceive as imputing to them a selfinterested economic motive in seeking to correct those very shortcomings and excesses for which the profession is so often criticized.
Any antitrust threat to peer review thus represents a serious con-
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frontation between traditional professionalism and the policy of
promoting competition in the health care marketplace.
This Article seeks to clarify the antitrust issues presented by
professional peer review, particularly the activities of organized
physicians.2 It concludes that, although certain professional traditions are indeed under challenge, peer review has an appropriate
place in a competitive market policed by the antitrust laws. The
Article views as mostly though not entirely unwarranted the concerns that have recently been expressed about the inhibiting effects
of private antitrust suits on professional peer review. 3 Although
the law is always subject to misuse by plaintiffs and misapplication
by courts, the usual antitrust tests, properly applied, impose only
reasonable limitations on physicians' collective activities. Thus,
there should be no need for special statutory immunities (such as
one recently enacted by Congress) or for judge-made doctrinal exceptions designed specifically to facilitate professional peer review.
Encrusting the law with special exceptions for privileged groups or
special treatment for particular activities is a poor approach precisely because it relieves courts of the necessity to rethink basic antitrust doctrine to make certain that it frustrates only conduct that is
truly incompatible with competition and consumer welfare.
I.

RELEVANT ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES

For antitrust purposes, the essential feature of medical peer review is that it involves collective action by otherwise independent,
competing physicians. 4 This collaboration may have adverse consequences for competition among the collaborators themselves or for
some of their competitors. It may nevertheless be defensible under
antitrust principles.
2. For a somewhat narrow definition of peer review for purposes of this Article, see
infra text accompanying notes 19-26. Although the main topic here is medical peer review,
other professionals who engage in independent practice also undertake concerted peer-review
activities that raise antitrust questions. See, eg., Union Labor Life Ins., Co. v. Pireno, 458
U.S. 119 (1982) (chiropractors); Iowa Dental Ass'n, 99 F.T.C. 648, 649-50 (1982) (dentists);
United States v. Illinois Podiatry Soc'y, 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,767 (N.D. Ill. 1977)
(podiatrists). The conclusions reached in this Article are equally applicable to other
professionals.
3. See, eg., AMA, InsurersBeef up M.D. Discipline Efforts, Am. Med. News, June 20,
1986, at 2 (physician leaders said to be "insistent... that no stepped-up peer review and peer
discipline can be accomplished without changes in the law that would protect physicians who
perform peer review from lawsuits of recrimination that might be filed by a disgruntled physician"); Dolin, supra note 1; Rust, Peer Review Confidentiality Key Issue in Lawsuit, Am.
Med. News, Oct. 25, 1985, at 1.
4. But see infra note 24.
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When competitors collaborate, section 1 of the Sherman Act
asks, in essence, whether their concerted action is compatible with
the maintenance of a competitive market as a vehicle to promote
consumer welfare.5 Collaboration between competitors is procompetitive when it manifests an impulse to compete, such as where a
joint venture is formed to achieve efficiencies in production and distribution or where it provides an altogether new product or service.
In other cases, competitors may permissibly combine in order to
make competition more effective by rectifying some defect in the
market's operation-as where they organize an auction market6 or
collect and disseminate information useful to themselves or to
7
consumers.
Accomplishment of these various procompetitive objectives does
not require that the collaborating parties be collectively powerful
enough to affect competition by raising prices, depressing output, or
preventing innovation. In those cases where possession of market
power is essential before a joint venture can accomplish its professed objectives, the venture is almost certainly unlawful, because it
constitutes a naked attempt to prevent the competitive process from
operating.8 As will be demonstrated, the legal status of professional
peer review depends heavily on whether its effect is to regulatethat is, actually control-medical practice in contravention of market forces or is instead only to generate information and advise independent decision makers in a competitive market.
There will be some cases in which, even though the goals of a
collaboration are procompetitive, the collective power of the collaborators, crudely measured, is great enough to warrant concern that
competition will be jeopardized. In these cases, the collaborators'
specific arrangements must be scrutinized to see whether the restraints they impose are reasonable in the limited sense that they are
both (1) ancillary to-that is, truly necessary to achieve-the alleged procompetitive objective and (2) crafted to minimize the risk
of anticompetitive effects.9 Even if a restraint is deemed ancillary
and reasonable under these tests some danger to competition may
still remain because of the parties' collective power. The court must
5. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
6. See, eg., Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), as narrowly
interpreted in National Soc'y of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693

n.19 (1978).
7. See, e-g., Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).

8. See infra text accompanying notes 75-83.
9. The best statement of the appropriate tests remains United States v. Addyston Pipe
& Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280-84 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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then decide whether that danger is outweighed by the potential benefits to consumers and to competition. This balancing can frequently be accomplished with only a "quick look," leading to a
blurring of antitrust law's traditional dichotomy between "per se"
violations and conduct requiring extensive examination under the
10
"Rule of Reason."
This brief exposition of antitrust theory11 leads to two observations that are particularly relevant to the discussion of professional
peer review. First, the law leaves virtually no room for defending a
restriction on competition by claiming that it was inspired by pure
or public-spirited motives. 2 Physicians sued for engaging in peer
review cannot simply plead that their purpose was a worthy one.
Instead, they must maintain that their actions were not incompatible with the maintenance of effective competition in the larger market for medical services. Even though evidence in antitrust suits
frequently focuses on the defendants' motives, motive is ultimately
relevant only as a reflection of the likely effect on competition of the
challenged practice. Physicians are mistaken in asserting that antitrust suits challenging their collective actions necessarily misconstrue their motives. An antitrust violation may exist even if the
motive behind an anticompetitive practice is virtuous in the highest
10. Courts can improve the quality of antitrust rules by going beyond the customary
dichotomization between per se prohibitions and a supposedly unitary Rule of Reason that
calls for the same level of scrutiny in every case. Recently the Solicitor General has suggested
that, in certain Rule of Reason cases, a "quick look" may be all that is required. Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance at 7-8, NCAA v. University of
Oklahoma, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 19-20,
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982). Others have advanced the
notion of a "truncated" rule of reason. See eg., Sullivan & Wiley, Recent Antitrust Developments: Defining the Scope of Exemptions, Expanding Coverage, and Reforming the Rule of
Reason, 27 UCLA L. REv. 265, 330-36, 341-42 (1979).
11. This summary of antitrust doctrine is somewhat more structured and coherent than
the analysis typically found in cases and commentary. This analysis focuses first on the collaborators' purpose (and the distinction between naked and ancillary restraints), then on their
market power (and the less-restrictive-alternative requirement that is triggered by its presence), and finally on the possible need to balance procompetitive and anticompetitive effects.
This analysis dispels two common but conceptually erroneous beliefs: that there is such a
thing as a "reasonable" restraint of trade and that the collaborators' intent is the central issue
rather than evidence of the probable effect of the collaboration. See generally H.
HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 110-34 (1985); ABA ANTI-

TRUST LAW SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 2-55 (2d ed. 1984); P. AREEDA,
THE RULE OF REASON IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: GENERAL ISSUES (Federal Judicial
Center 1981); E. GELLHORN, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 175-257 (3d ed. 1986).
12. See National Soc'y of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693-94
(1978) (rejecting defense that restricting competitive bidding for professional services would
ensure public safety). But see infra text accompanying notes 73-80.
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professional tradition.13
It is a regrettable but easily defensible feature of antitrust law
that those individual professionals who take their public responsibilities most seriously and selflessly contribute their time and energy
to operate a self-regulatory program are the ones exposed to liability
if the program is ultimately adjudged to restrain trade. A court
may find that the collaborators, despite their good intentions, were
operating on a mistaken premise 'when they interfered with the
competitive process. Although a few courts, sensing a benign impulse underlying some professional restraints, have been inclined to
excuse them, 14 the safest legal rule for professionals to follow is that
the competitive power can never be restrained, even for a worthy
15
purpose.
13. See, eg., Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soe'y, 457 U.S. 332, 348 (1982) (applying per se rule to maximum fee limits imposed by physicians on themselves); AMA v. FTC,
638 F.2d 443, 449-50 (2d Cir. 1980) (upholding FTC invalidation of provisions of professional code of ethics), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 445 U.S. 676 (1982).
14. Eg., United States v. Oregon State Med. Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 336 (1952) (dictum
suggesting lawfulness of boycott for ethical objectives); Indiana Fed'n of Dentists v. FTC, 745
F.2d 1124, 1136 (7th Cir. 1984) (dentists' agreement in restraint of trade excused as protecting professional values), rev'd, 106 S.Ct. 225 (1986); Wilk v. AMA, 719 F.2d 207, 221-22,
226-27 (7th Cir. 1983) (allowing association to justify boycott of competitors by reference to
patient-care concerns), cert denied, 467 U.S. 1210 (1984).
15. It is doubtful that lawyers counselling professional clients are relying on the view
that professional services are special and therefore subject to "soft" antitrust rules. See infra
note 36. Even if the competitive market is deemed to perform poorly in some respect, there
is no solid legal ground for absolving professional actions that interfere with its operation.
See Havighurst & Hackbarth, Enforcing the Rules of FreeEnterprise in an Imperfect Market:
The Case ofIndividualPracticeAssociations, in A NEw APPROACH TO THE ECONOMICS OF
HEALTH CARE 377 (M. Olson ed. 1982). For the suggestion that minor restraints correcting
"market failures" might be permissible, see infra text accompanying notes 75-83.
One justification for maintaining rigorous antitrust rules that do not bend for good intentions or public-interest claims is the desirability of maintaining a strong deterrent to violations; effective deterrence requires a bright line denying competitors pretexts that might
tempt them to impair socially desirable competition in the hope that their claim of a worthy
purpose will shield them from at least the most severe penalties. See, eg., Northern Pac. Ry.
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (articulating basic rationale for bright line, per se rules
of illegality in antitrust law); Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343-48
(1982) (delineating virtues of clear rules). Another argument for a rigorous and certain rule
is the inappropriateness of letting "the vague and varying opinion ofjudges... [determine]
how much, on principles of political economy, men ought to be allowed to restrain competition." United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 283-84 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd,
175 U.S. 211 (1899).
Although restraints of trade should not be tolerated simply on the ground that they serve
the general public interest, the law must leave room for concerted action that is procompetitive. Unfortunately, some Supreme Court opinions have suggested that courts are helpless,
under precedents creating per se violations, to distinguish procompetitive from anticompetitive collaboration and may sometimes be compelled to condemn useful activity. Eg., Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 348-55 (1982) (discussed infra note 70
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The second observation that is prompted by the formulation of
antitrust doctrine offered above is that the fate of individual competitors is not a primary legal concern of antitrust law. Although
litigation against a peer-review body is most likely to be initiated by

an injured physician, the appropriate concern is with effects on

"competition, not competitors." 16 If a practice impairs competition
to the presumed detriment of consumers, a victim of that practice
may have standing17 to recover treble damages. But harm to that
individual is not harm to competition itself. Competition specifically contemplates that some competitors will lose while others
prosper, and courts' insistence on fair dealing by competitors vis-avis one another could itself easily reduce the vigor of competition
and harm consumer welfare. 8 In the final analysis, the true object
of the Sherman Act is to protect the competitive process. It should
not penalize competitor collaboration unless that process is
impaired.
Professional peer review constitutes concerted action by competitors and is subject to antitrust scrutiny. Because it has an important impact on other competitors, it is likely to result in antitrust
and accompanying text); Topco Ass'ns. v. United States, 405 U.S. 596, 608-12 (1972). But
see Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., No. 84-5845, slip op. (D.C. Cir. June
3, 1986) (opinion by Bork, J., applying rule of reason to market division by joint venturers).
Even if courts seeking the clarity of per se rules have tied their own hands to some extent,
there should be no obstacle to intelligent application of the law to peer review, which does not
fall within any of the categories of conduct traditionally treated by the courts as per se offenses. For a recent attempt to overcome antitrust law's difficulty in dealing sensibly with
peer-review efforts in the hospital setting, see Havighurst, DoctorsandHospitals: An Antitrust
Perspective on TraditionalRelationships, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1071.
16. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977). See also
Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1977) (refocusing law of
vertical restraints more on harm to competition than on freedom of dealers).
17. On the law of standing in antitrust cases, see generally H. HOVENKAMP, supra note
11, at 356-66; Berger & Bernstein, An Analytical Frameworkfor Antitrust Standing,86 YALE
L.J. 809 (1977).
18. Antitrust law does not specifically require that competitors must behave fairly toward one another, but fairness is sometimes insisted upon by courts as a way of protecting
against injury to competition. See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341,
349 (1962) (discussed infra text accompanying note 97). Antitrust law appears to be moving
from seeking to enforce fairness in business dealings between large and small firms-at some
expense to efficiency-into an era in which the dominant concern is consumer welfare, as
served by efficiency in production and by hard-as opposed to judically-inhibited-bargaining and competition. The debate concerning the transition is extensive and ongoing. See,
e.g., R. BORK, THE ANTITRUsT PARADOX (1978); R. POSNER, ANTrrRUsT LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976); Kissam, Antitrust Boycott Doctrine, 69 IowA L. REv. 1165
(1984) (arguing for stressing fairness); Symposium, Antitrust Law and Economics, 127 U. PA.
L. REV. 918 (1979); Antitrust Jurisprudence: A Symposium on the Economic, Politicaland
Social Goals ofAntitrust Policy, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1182 (1977); Sullivan, Book Review, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 1214 (1975).

PROFESSIONAL PEER REVIEW

1123

lawsuits. But whether peer review is procompetitive or anticompetitive cannot be determined until more is known about how it
operates.
II.

PEER REVIEW IN ACTION

Peer review encompasses a wide range of professional activities,
including the informal, collegial oversight and interaction that occur within medical group practices and hospital medical staffs. 19 At
the other extreme, there are communitywide peer-review bodies, including foundations for medical care, which review claims for private insurers,20 and Peer Review Organizations (PROs), which are
formed pursuant to federal law primarily to review care provided to
Medicare beneficiaries but which also provide peer-review services
to private payors. 2 1
This Article, in addressing antitrust issues, focuses specifically
on those peer-review bodies that are controlled by or operate on
behalf of a substantial percentage of the physicians in a community
and concern themselves with care rendered and paid for in the private sector. Because of this limited focus, the Article has little to
say about group practices or hospital medical staffs.2 2 It also does
not consider the Medicare-related activities of PROs and their forerunners, Professional Standards Review Organizations (PSROs). 23
19. For an extensive evaluation of the hospital medical staff, see Havighurst, supra note
15, at 1092-97, 1101-42.
20. See, eg., Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 339-42 (1982)
(describing two such organizations); C. STEInWALD, AN INTRODUCTION TO FOUNDATIONS
FOR MEDICAL CARE (1971); Egdahl, Foundationsfor Medical Care,288 NEW ENG. J. MED.
491 (1973).
21. Peer Review Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 143, 96 Stat. 382,
385, 387 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1302c-3 (1982)). The statute requires that a PRO contracting with the federal government must "make available its facilities and resources for
contracting with private and public entities paying for health care in its area for review, as
feasible and appropriate, of services reimbursed by such entities." 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a)(1)
(1982). See also infra note 25; see generally Webber & Goldbeck, Utilization Review, in SYNTHESIS OF PRIVATE SECTOR HEALTH CARE INITIATIVES ch. 4 (Office of the Asst. Sec'y for
Planning and Evaluation, DHHS, March 1984); Hastings, Legal Issues Raised by Private
Review Activities of Medical Peer-Review Organizations, 8 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & LAW
293 (1983).
22. It is intended to exclude from consideration, among other things, those physiciancontrolled entities that function within a larger competing entity, such as a hospital (see Havighurst, supra note 15), or that are themselves entities competing against other physicians in
the community, such as a group practice or preferred-provider organization. Such organizations may present difficult antitrust issues, but they are distinct from those related to peer
review itself. See infra note 87.
23. Regarding PSROs, see generally CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, The Impact of
PSROs on Health-CareCosts: Update of CBO's 1979 Evaluation (1981); Smits, The PSRO in
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As long as these latter entities merely review claims under public
programs pursuant to a congressional mandate, they are not subject
to the antitrust laws because such laws do not preclude the federal
government from administering its own programs. In contrast,
PROs that are sponsored by professional interests24 and undertake
to review privately financed care appear to enjoy no implied exemption from antitrust scrutiny, despite their statutory obligation 2to5
make their "facilities and resources" available to private payors.
Perspective,305 NEW ENG. J. MED. 253 (1981); Havighurst & Blumstein, Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-offs in Medical Care: The Role ofPSROs, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 6, 38-60 (1975).
24. Whether a particular PRO should be viewed as a powerful combination of competitors or as a simple joint venture competing to provide claims-review services to public and
private payors could easily become a matter of dispute. Under the PRO legislation, two types
of organizations are given a special preference in seeking PRO designation. One of these
types, a "physician-sponsored organization," is defined in regulations as one composed of at
least 10% of the area's licensed practicing physicians. See 42 C.F.R. § 462.102(b) (1985).
The AMA sought to obtain a preference for organizations representing at least 25% of the
area's physicians (as under the earlier PSRO law). See Editorial, Proposed Regulations on
PROs Raise Concerns, Am. Med. News, Oct. 7, 1983, at 3. Although the action of the Health
Care Financing Administration in setting the lower percentage test for physician sponsorship
may have somewhat attenuated the connection between such PROs and organized medicine,
the cited regulations also require that a physician-sponsored PRO must be "representative"
of area physicians. Moreover, a physician-sponsored PRO is generally understood to be one
that enjoys sponsorship of the profession as a whole. Finally, because the Peer Review Improvement Act provides that a financial intermediary, such as a Blue Cross plan, could be
designated as the area PRO if a physician-sponsored group could not be identified within six
months, state medical societies had a strong incentive to organize a PRO of their own. Of the
first 19 PRO contracts awarded, 15 went to groups organized with medical society support.
Only in Idaho has a financial intermediary received a PRO contract.
There are of course other, community-based peer-review bodies that are directly and obviously sponsored by the medical establishment and thus more clearly present the risks that
prompt antitrust scrutiny. See generally C. STEINWALD, supra note 20; Egdahl, supra note
20.
25. Because of the large responsibilities assigned PROs under the Medicare program,
most discussion of professional peer review focuses primarily on its role with respect to publicly financed care. See, e.g., K. LOHR, PEER REVIEW ORGANIZATIONS: QUALITY ASSURANCE IN MEDICARE (Rand Corp. 1985); Dans, Weiner & Otter, Peer Review Organizations:
Promises and PotentialPitfalls, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1131 (1985). It is easy to assume
that peer review of privately financed care is such a natural extension of the concept embodied in the Medicare program that no legal or other distinction should be drawn. It appears,
however, that the PRO legislation, which invites, and thus implicitly exempts, PRO activities
affecting public programs from the antitrust laws, provides no comparable immunity for
PROs participating in private review. Despite the argument that such private review activities are expressly mandated by federal law (see supra note 21), the statute says only that a
PRO must make its "facilities and resources" available to the private sector. Thus, it contemplates that private payors will delegate to PROs only the administrative task of applying the
payor's own standards to particular cases, not the more crucial responsibility of establishing
the standards themselves. Indeed, the legislation seems to have been carefully crafted to
ensure only that PROs, with their elaborate review mechanisms in place in each community,
would be available to help private insurers, which often lack the capacity to deal with providers on the spot, apply their own criteria for payment. This legislative scheme leaves PROs
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Another type of professional activity that is excluded from consideration as peer review in this Article is the scrutiny of individual

practitioners that is undertaken by a local medical society or other
professional organization to determine their eligibility for organization membership. In addition to peer approval, nearly all such professional organizations confer significant social and professional
benefits and advantages on their members. When these latter, possibly unique benefits are specifically tied to compliance with the organization's membership standards, the organization becomes more

than a mere credentialing or peer-review body and may be, for antitrust purposes, a horizontal combination of competitors who have
nakedly agreed, through the setting of standards, to compete only in
specific ways. 26 Because this Article's focus is on collective profes-

sional actions that yield only authoritative information, judgments,
and advice for use by independent decision makers, professional orthat have preempted the role of setting payment policies for private payors open to possible
challenge (though not necessarily to liability) under the legal principles developed in later
discussion. Thus, Congress did not contemplate that PROs would necessarily perform for
private payors the same coverage-definition functions that PSROs performed for the Medicare program under passive cost reimbursement. See infra notes 34, 52 and accompanying
text.
The argument was once made that professional organizations providing administrative
assistance to private health insurers were entitled to the antitrust exemption for "the business
of insurance" under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011-15 (1982). This argument was rejected in Union Labor Life Ins., Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982). It seems
clear that that exemption should not extend to restraints occurring in markets for insured
services. See Crump & Maxwell, Health Cars Cost Containment, and the Antitrust Laws" A
Legal and Economic Analysis of the Pireno Case, 56 S. CAL. L. Rav. 913 (1983); Borsody &
Tiano, PeerReview and the Antitrust Laws: An Analysis and a Proposal,26 ST. Louis U.L.J.
511, 517-23 (1982); Note, Antitrust Implications of ChiropracticPeer Review Committees, 8
AM. J. L. & MED. 45, 50-57 (1982).
26. The author has addressed the legal issues surrounding membership policies of professional societies in the context of private credentialing. See Havighurst & King, Private
CredentialingofHealth CarePersonnel: An Antitrust Perspective(pt. 1), 9 AM. J. L. & MED.
131, 150-84 (1983). That discussion specifically observes "the risk that a professional association could parlay the tangible advantages of membership into a system for controlling the
competitive behavior of a large number of physicians." Id. at 172. In discussing an orthodontist society's exclusion of a dentist for delegating tasks to a licensed but uncertified practitioner, the article suggested that, "although such a membership criterion might seem related
to a professional objective of ensuring the quality of care, the implied agreement among members to foreswear one form of lawful competition and to boycott nonmembers would undoubtedly be held to violate the antitrust laws today." Ifa at 167 (discussing Pinsker v.
Pacific Coast Society of Orthodontists, 12 Cal. 3d 541, 526 P.2d 253, 116 Cal. Rptr. 245
(1974)). For a statute treating professional society membership determinations as peer review, see the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, - Stat. (1986). This legislation carries some risk that it will immunize professional organizations
against private damage suits alleging not just that a member was excluded to eliminate him as
a competitor but that he was disciplined pursuant to an unlawful horizontal agreement limiting competition among the society's members. See infra text accompanying notes 126-31.
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ganizations that directly enforce their judgments are not considered
to be engaged, strictly speaking, in peer review. The reasons for the
distinction thus drawn will become increasingly clear.
Communitywide physician peer-review organizations review
private transactions for different purposes, each of which raises different antitrust issues. One common function of peer-review bodies
has been to determine the reasonableness of fees charged by individual professionals for particular insured services. This activity is occasioned by the practice of many health insurers of paying whatever
amount a physician elects to charge, so long as it does not exceed a
"usual, customary, and reasonable" (UCR) fee. 7 The medical profession has offered peer-review committees to insurers to resolve disputes that arise with respect to particular bills under the UCR
approach to physician compensation. Because these committees
concern themselves with the price of services, antitrust questions
naturally arise. To the extent that professional fee review is only
retrospective and advisory, however, any antitrust problems it
presents are distinguishable from those that justify the usual per se
condemnation of naked price-fixing agreements.2 8
Utilization review is another function of peer review. This activity, which is often combined with fee review, focuses on the necessity and appropriateness of particular medical services. Private
health insurance policies typically commit the insurer to pay only
for services that are "medically necessary." 29 Many insurers have
subscribed to professional peer review as a mechanism for deciding
27. For a description and defense of this payment method, see Crump & Maxwell, supra
note 25, at 915-18. See also infra note 51 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 69-72 and accompanying text (discussion of Arizona v. Maricopa
County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982)). See also cases cited infra note 86. For a discussion
of profession-sponsored relative value scales used in setting medical fees, see Havighurst &
Kissam, The AntitrustImplications ofRelative Value Studies in Medicine, 4 J. HEALTH POL.,
POL'Y & L. 48 (1979). Numerous consent decrees have invalidated relative value scales. But
see United States v. American Soc'y of Anesthesiologists, 473 F. Supp. 147, 160-61 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (refusing to condemn relative value guides as per se violations). See also Pfizenmayer,
Antitrust Law and Collective Physician Negotiations with Third Parties: The Relative Value
Guide Object Lesson, 7 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 128 (1982) (offering countervailing
power defense for collective actions stopping short of overt price fixing). In Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 781 (1975), the Supreme Court said that if the lawyers'
minimum fee schedule in that case had been "purely advisory," a "different question" would
have been presented.
29. See, e.g., Union Labor Life Ins., Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 122 (1982) (observing
how insurer's "policies limit the company's liability to 'the reasonablecharges' for 'necessary'
medical care and services" (emphasis in original) (citation omitted)). Such policies are
typical.
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which services meet this contractual criterion. 30 Although the antitrust concerns raised by profession-sponsored utilization review
are less obvious than the objections to fee determinations, tampering with system output can be as harmful to consumers as tampering with price.3 1 Once again, however, the precise reason for
antitrust concern is somewhat unclear.
Yet another focus of professional peer review is the quality of
care being provided. Although the rationale for quality review
would seem to contrast sharply with the cost-containment objective
that motivates review of fees and utilization practices, the two concerns are frequently blended in a single program. Many professionals are more receptive to the idea of quality-oriented peer review
than they are to outsiders' questioning of their discretion for the
purposes of cost control. As a result, peer-review bodies and their
professional sponsors regularly seek to justify their cost-containment efforts as being, in reality, quality-assurance measures. This
method of justifying cost containment leads to some semantic confusion,3 2 but it reflects the widely shared belief that peer-review
bodies should balance quality concerns against cost objectives in appraising utilization and the reasonableness of fees. The view that
professional bodies are ultimately responsible for reconciling cost
considerations and quality claims is firmly rooted in professional
tradition. It may, however, offend antitrust policy if private choices
are thus preempted.
Although quality is a constant watchword in all profession30. See United Labor Life Ins., Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 123 (1982) ("In making
some of these determinations, ULL has arranged ... to use the advice of NYSCA's Peer
Review Committee."). Large employers have also relied upon professional organizations
such as PSROs to review claims under their health insurance programs. See, eg., Rhode
Island Professional Standards Review Org., 101 F.T.C. 1010 (1983) (FrC advisory opinion
approving private utilization review for employers); see also Hearing on Proposed Phaseout
of PSROs and Utilization Review Requirements, before the Subcomm. on Health, Senate
Comm. on Finance, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 84-97 (1984) (testimony of Duane H. Heintz, Deere
& Co.); id. at 28-29 (statement of Gregory J. Ahart, General Accounting Office); see also
Hearing on PSRO Proposals before the Subcomm. on Health, Senate Conm. on Finance,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. passim (1982) [hereinafted cited as Hearing on PRSO Proposals]. Reports of favorable results of such peer-review efforts led Congress to provide for private sector
review by PROs. See supra note 21.
31. See infra note 71.
32. See Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 28, at 45 (noting how, in the early days of
implementation of the PSRO program, " 'quality of care' became something of a 'code word'
for professional prerogatives, and 'cost control' was soft-pedaled, having become a 'buzz
word' for government interference"); see also Tabak, PSROs: Mechanismsfor Quality Assurance or Cost Containment?, Quality Assurance Bull., Dec. 1978, at 15. For a thoughtful
effort to define quality in light of the cost of achieving it, see A. DONABEDIAN, THE DEFINITION OF QUALrrY AND APPROACHES TO ITS ASSESSMENT 3-28 (1980).
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sponsored peer review, quality assurance is also an independent
function of many peer-review programs, which may single out individual practitioners as lacking essential skills or as being neglectful
of their patients' welfare. This quality-assurance mission may be
carried out for some of the same clients that are served by costcontainment efforts. For example, the quality-oriented peer review
that occurs within group practices, hospitals, and HMOs can be
best understood as part of the sponsoring entity's effort to improve
its performance and to compete with other entities.33 Similarly, the
Medicare program relies upon PROs to ensure that its beneficiaries
are not the victims of overeconomizing by providers seeking to
profit from the prospective payment system.3 4 Although private insurers have not been very interested in the quality dimension of the
care they underwrite, insurers and employers are likely to see an
increasing need-as cost-containment efforts intensify-to assure
patients that cost savings are not being achieved at the expense of
their health.
Quality-oriented peer review undertaken for specific private clients is easily regarded as procompetitive as long as the client remains ultimately in charge.3 Substantial antitrust problems arise
only when the peer-review body purports to function, not for a specific client, but on behalf of the community as a whole. Such peer
review, if it is done scrupulously and evenhandedly, may manifest
the medical profession's sense of collective responsibility for the
welfare of patients whose ignorance of the technical side of
medicine may expose them to a real risk of incompetence. Antitrust
oversight may still be needed, however, to protect against possible
abuse and preemption of consumer choice.
Peer-review bodies are generally barred by antitrust law from
imposing direct and explicit sanctions that would enable them to
33. See, e.g., Havighurst, supra note 15, at 1029-98, 1126-31 (stating procompetitive
arguments for hospital based peer review).
34. Recent changes in the method of paying hospitals under Medicare have dramatically
changed the function of professional peer review within the program. Previously, when hospitals were reimbursed for their retrospectively determined costs, peer review was employed
to ensure that only needed services were provided and that patients were not hospitalized
longer than necessary. With respect to the PSRO program, under which cost containment
was a primary objective, see generally Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 23. With the
recent shift to payment of prospectively fixed allowances determined by reference to the patient's diagnosis, peer review is now needed to ensure that corners are not cut by hospitals
seeking to profit from non-cost-based reimbursement. Regarding the role of PROs under the
reformed Medicare, see K. LOHR, supra note 25; Dans, Weiner & Otter, supra note 25.
35. See Havighurst, supra note 15, at 1116-22, 1125-31 (discussing peer review in the
hospital setting and emphasizing the need for hospital authority over the medical staff).
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enforce quality standards for the entire community. Thus, coercive
boycotts of unapproved providers3 6 and other agreements by which
competitors surrender their freedom of action to achieve some common objective are almost certainly unlawful regardless of their arguably worthy purpose.37 Despite their inability to take direct
action to maintain quality standards, however, peer reviewers may
still exert substantial influence over market outcomes. For instance,
their findings of quality deficiencies may be used by public licensing
authorities, hospitals, insurers, referring physicians, and patients
themselves. As long as these independent actors decide for themselves whether to act on the information and advice provided by the
peer reviewers, antitrust law is not obviously offended.
Antitrust actions may nevertheless arise if the peer reviewers are
perceived to be part of a larger conspiracy. Moreover, a peer-review
body may also be sued on the theory that it is itself an unlawful
combination of competitors. The risk of liability may be particularly great if the peer-review body lacks the legitimacy conferred by
a vertical relationship with an independent client and appears as an
extra-governmental agency exercising powers akin to those of public regulators.3 8 The antitrust defense for such communitywide
quality assurance must be carefully framed if legal risks are to be
kept manageable.
36. Boycotts are usually treated as per se violations of the Sherman Act. See, eg.,
Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959) (boycott, concerted
refusals to deal by traders); Fashion Originators' Guild v. FrC, 312 U.S. 457, 466 (1941)
(guild member manufacturers and retailers); Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S.
341, 347-49, 360 (1963) (declaring boycotts for self-regulatory purposes per se violation in the
absence of special legislation, such as that authorizing stock exchanges to make rules restricting members' dealings with third parties). One court, however, has made a questionable
exception for physician boycotts of competitors for "patient-care motives." Wilk v. AMA,
719 F.2d 207, 219, 221-22, 226-27 (7th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 467 U.S. 1210 (1984). In
addition, in AMA v. United States, 130 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1942), aff'd, 317 U.S. 519
(1943), the court of appeals, while finding certain boycotts unlawful, stated that the defendants "were permitted to organize, to establish standards of professional conduct [and] to
effect agreements for self-discipline and control." AMA, 130 F.2d at 248 (emphasis in original). Nevertheless, professionals would be ill-advised to rely on this dictum or the Wilk case
to justify imposing coercive sanctions. The conceptual difference between taking direct action
to exclude a competitor from the market and merely publishing information and opinion is
fundamental in antitrust law. See, eg., Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n. v.
United States, 234 U.S. 600, 614 (1914) (retailers circulating list of wholesalers that sold
directly to consumers held in violation because of clear intention to boycott).
37. See infra text accompanying notes 75-83.
38. On the fundamental significance of the involvement of an independent party standing in a vertical market relationship with the horizontal combination, see Havighurst, supra
note 15, at 1147-57.
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CONCEPTUALIZING THE ANTITRUST DEFENSE FOR PEER
REVIEW

The actions of peer-review bodies are typically defended, both
in policy debates and in the courts, in the same way that the actions
of public regulatory agencies are defended-as actions taken in the
public interest with due process and the support of substantial evidence. However natural it may be to defend peer review as a regulatory service to the public, an antitrust defense on this ground is
conceptually mistaken. Moreover, it exposes the peer reviewers to a
greater risk of antitrust liability and to greater litigation costs than
they would face under a properly mounted defense.
The best antitrust defense for peer-review efforts is that, far from
restraining trade, peer review is entirely consistant with the maintenance of competition and actually helps the competitive process. If
they have done their job properly, peer reviewers can maintain that
they have merely provided appropriate decisionmakers with information and authoritative advice that they cannot otherwise easily
obtain. This argument is most persuasive when the peer reviewers
are employed by a particular client who specifically seeks such information and advice. It is also valid, however, when the peer-review body is acting on its own initiative. Of course, the peer
reviewers must confine their efforts to collecting and disseminating
information for others to use and must not engage in coercive boycotts. As long as peer reviewers do not assume a coercive, regulatory role,39 they can reasonably contend that they have not
restrained trade.
Even the provision of biased or inaccurate information by peer
reviewers is not, without more, a restraint of trade under any reasonable definition of that phrase. Even though unfairness is possible, the existence of state tort remedies for defamation, unfair
competition, insurer bad faith, and interference with private contracts should obviate the invention of a spurious antitrust theory to
redress perceived injuries.4" For purposes of antitrust restraint-oftrade analysis, providing the consuming public with misleading information or bad advice does not interfere with the independent,
decentralized decision making that is the essential characteristic of
a competitive market.4" Moreover, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine4 2
39. See infra text accompanying note 47.
40. For discussion of the application of such common-law theories to professional certification and accreditation activities, see Havighurst & King, supra note 26, at 163-64.
41. But cf BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, FTC, Standards and Certification

275 (1983), stating that a standard-setting program "restrains trade by diverting business
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provides a specific defense for many concerted efforts to influence
public opinion and governmental action. Representations by competitor groups to licensing authorities should enjoy substantial pro-

tection against antitrust attack under this doctrine. The first
amendment considerations underlying the Noerr-Pennington doctrine's narrow construction of the Sherman Act43 should also inspire a favorable view of collective efforts by peer reviewers to
inform consumers and their agents on subjects relevant to consumer
welfare.44
from one competitor to another." Id Although this view is probably widely shared by the
unsophisticated (the Bureau of Consumer Protection is not the FTC's antitrust enforcement
arm), it is incorrect because, whatever influence a private body's standards may have, the
competitive process remains unimpaired.
42. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine was developed in three Supreme Court cases. In
Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), the
Court held that the Sherman Act did not apply to the railroads' deceptive use of the media to
procure legislation adverse to trucking interests. See id. at 138, 145. The Court cautioned
that:
There may be situations in which a publicity campaign ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to cover what is actually
nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of
a competitor [in which case] the application of the Sherman Act would be justified.
Id at 144. See also United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965) ("[]oint
efforts to influence public officials [did] not violate the antitrust laws even though intended to
eliminate competition"). In California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S.
508, 510-11 (1972), the Court extended the concepts established in Noerr and Pennington to
shelter concerted activities aimed at influencing administrative agencies or courts to take
actions harmful to competitors. In spite of the argument that the established truckers were
merely petitioning their government, allegations of their concerted and excessive opposition
to the grant of new operating authority were held to bring their actions within the Noerr
decision's "sham" exception to the general principle that antitrust law should not frustrate
the exercise of political rights. See id. at 515-16.
43. Some cases erroneously treat the Noerr doctrine as a constitutional check on the
reach of the Sherman Act, implying that the Act reaches by its terms any action taken to
procure a political or regulatory result that does not qualify as protected speech. E.g., Crown
Central Petroleum Corp. v. Waldman, 486 F. Supp. 759, 766 (M.D. Pa.), rev'd on other
grounds, 634 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1980) (condemning a boycott for political purposes because it
was "conduct beyond pure speech used to petition the government"). The better view is to
treat the Noerr doctrine as simply a narrow construction of the Sherman Act. See, eg.,
Missouri v. National Org. for Women, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842
(1980) (construing the Sherman Act not to apply to boycott of convention facilities in Missouri aimed at getting state to ratify Equal Rights Amendment). See generally Raup, MedicaidBoycotts by Health Care Providers A Noerr-PenningtonDefense, 69 IowA L. REv.1393
(1984).
44. Rather than becoming entangled in first amendment issues (see supra note 43),
courts should recognize that competitive markets, which the Sherman Act protects, require
information and opinion to function smoothly. Thus, the first amendment and the Sherman
Act, far from being in conflict, have similar objectives. Indeed, recent decisions declaring
impediments to the flow of commercial information unconstitutional are expressly based on
the value of such information to consumers, thus reflecting a policy concern identical to that
underlying the antitrust laws. See, eg., Bates v. States Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 364
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A defense for peer-review programs that implicitly equates them
with public regulatory agencies is misguided precisely because, instead of demanding that the plaintiff demonstrate that trade has
been restrained, it concedes the false doctrine that an injury to a
competitor is an injury to competition and is to be condemned unless it was inflicted for a worthy purpose. It thus invites close judicial scrutiny to determine the "reasonableness" of the peer
reviewers' particular action, entailing a lengthy trial to elicit all the
facts bearing on the merits of the action and the motives of the parties. Even if this defense succeeds, it may do so only after exhaustive and expensive litigation. By allowing a plaintiff-physician to
equate his welfare with that of consumers, the usual defense of peerreview activity diverts attention from the procompetitive value of
the overall effort and, by letting a jury guess at motives, increases
the chance that liability will be found. 5
An irony here is that the willingness of the defense side in a
peer-review case to concede the main premise of the plaintiff's complaint probably originates with the peer reviewers themselves. Professionals engaged in peer review tend to view their activities as
being comparable to public regulation and not as merely an effort to
generate information and advice useful to consumers.4 6 The medical profession's long tradition of simultaneously denying the efficacy
of market forces in health care and resisting government regulation
has led professionals to assume that they are expected to regulate
themselves. Under an antitrust regime, however, there is almost no
room for competitor-sponsored private regulation, if that term is
narrowly defined as actual control of market behavior by agreements to engage in or eschew particular conduct or to impose coer(1977) (commercial speech has indispensible role in resource allocation); Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 763 (1976) (consumer interest in commercial information as keen as political interest). For a discussion of these policy
issues in connection with the antitrust treatment of private accrediting, credentialing, and
standard-setting programs, see Havighurst & King, supra note 26, at 194-97.
45. For comparable arguments aimed at reducing the antitrust risks of other professional bodies engaged in legitimate quality-assurance activities, see Havighurst & King, supra
note 26, at 169-84, 189-201 (accrediting and credentialing programs), and Havighurst, supra
note 15, at 1108-39 (medical staff and hospital decisions on admitting privileges).
46. If anything, increased competition in the health field puts the patient at greater
risk and requires sophisticated and accurate regulatory efforts to protect both patients and payers, or rather, taxpayers. I am convinced that the PSROs remain the
best, most accurate, and most sensitive regulatory mechanism available for the protection of those at risk.
PSRO Proposals: HearingsBefore the Subcomn. on Health of the Comm. on Finance, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 141-42 (1982) (presentation of Michael R. McGarvey, M.D., on behalf of the
New York Statewide Professional Standards Review Council, Inc.) See also infra note 49.
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cive sanctions on those who violate privately promulgated
standards.47 The illegality of such self-regulation lies, not in the
collaborative setting of standards, but in the agreements by which
they are enforced or otherwise implemented. Trade is not restrained by the nonregulatory acts of setting standards and publicizing the fact that some providers are not meeting them. Although
physicians may need to modify their definition of professionalism
somewhat to accommodate the requirements of competition, the
medical profession should be free to organize in order to advise particular clients or the general public concerning the price, appropriateness, and quality of health services.
The distinction made here between harming competitors by collectively refusing to deal with them and harming them by collectively influencing others will strike many as hairsplitting. This
reaction reflects the continued confusion between harm to a competitor and harm to competition. As long as the ultimate decisions-whether to comply with the standards oneself, to insist upon
compliance by others with whom one deals, or to seek, believe, or
act upon the peer reviewers' advice--continue to be made independently in the marketplace, the competitive process continues to operate. Indeed, giving independent decision makers information as
to whether certain standards are being followed actually aids the
competitive process; even if the standards are poorly chosen or improperly applied, the process itself is not impaired.
The forgoing conclusion, which is drawn by focusing on the integrity of the process itself and not on the outcome of the process in
particular instances, is supported by analogy to the first amendment. The American free speech tradition presumes that the provision of more, even inconsistent, information and advice to
consumers is desirable and that imposing high standards of truthfulness and objective accuracy unacceptably chills the production of
information and opinion. The competitive marketplace is, in the
American system, the best place to sort out truth from falsehood.4 8
47. See supra note 36.
48. For a lengthy development of the thesis that the production of information and
opinion regarding professional services should be neither closely regulated by courts nor monopolized by professional interests, see Havighurst & King, supra note 26. That Article
draws at critical points on the first amendment tradition, noting that many of the issues are as
much ideological as technical or scientific. See id at 189-97; Havighurst & King, Private
Credentialingof Health Care Personnel. An Antitrust Perspective (pt. 2), 9 AM. J. L. & MED.
263, 288-97. No positive value should be attached to the obtaining of a single, authoritative
judgment on questions related to fees, utilization, or quality; see infra text accompanying
notes 112-20.
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PEER REVIEW IN AN HISTORICAL AND POLICY CONTEXT

The foregoing legal defense of professional peer review rests
upon a narrower conception of peer review than that which generally prevails in the medical community and in the health care industry as a whole. Both professional and lay observers assume that
peer review is more than a source of useful, procompetitive information and opinion. Most believe that peer review is intended to provide definitive answers to the crucial questions lying at the heart of
each medical care transaction: whether the service was appropriate,
its quality acceptable, and its price fair.49 Indeed, the original premise of professional peer review was that the medical profession was
the sole legitimate authority on all such matters.5 0 To the extent
that final decisions on such crucial economic issues were thus
placed in professional hands, the marketplace was unable to resolve
trade-offs between quality and cost, to translate consumer preferences into provider performance, and to allocate society's scarce resources among alternative medical and nonmedical uses. Because
the antitrust laws are offended by producers' impairments of the
competitive process and infringements on consumer sovereignty,
professional peer review must be examined in its actual historical
context to determine whether the theoretical defense offered for it
above may misapprehend reality.
The authority of professional norms and standards and of the
professional bodies that enunciate and apply those norms and standards was long taken for granted in the health care field. Public
and private health plans, by undertaking to cover all medically necessary care, implicitly accepted the practice standards that prevailed
in the professional community as the appropriate measure of their
responsibility to pay.5 It followed naturally from the premise implicit in these plans that profession-sponsored peer-review bodies
should decide the liability of health insurers in close cases. The federal PSRO program, under which local professional bodies were ex49. The following statement is typical: "As a physician I have always been supportive of
efforts which help to ensure that patients are assured a common standard of care regardless of
the source of reimbursement." Hearing on PSRO Proposals, supra note 30, at 156 (statement
of John Graham, President, Foundation for Health Care Evaluation, Minneapolis).
50. Senator Wallace Bennett viewed the Professional Standards Review Organization
Act of 1970 as providing physicians with "an imaginative and exciting opportunity to assume
basic responsibility for reviewing health care as a whole." 116 CONG. REc. 22,475 (1970).
51. See e.g., Union Labor Life Ins., Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 123 (1982) (chiropractor peer review committee offered advice as to medical necessity and reasonable prices); see
also Havighurst, Decentralizing Decision Making: Private Contract Versus Professional
Norms, in MARKET REFORMS IN HEALTH CARE 22, 24-28 (J. Meyer ed. 1983).
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pressly allowed to define appropriate utilization and thus to decide
the extent of the federal government's commitment to pay for professional services, was the most striking manifestation of deference
to professional authority.5 2
The UCR-fee approach to physician compensation, also widely
employed in both public and private financing programs, was
founded on the assumption that prices, too, are a matter appropriately left to expert professional judgment. In effect, payors went
along with the medical profession's claim that the great majority of
physicians, as ethical practitioners, would not, by demanding more
than a reasonable fee, abuse the pricing discretion they enjoyed by
virtue of third-party financing. 3 In addition, the profession was
deemed the ultimate authority on quality issues. For instance, malpractice jurisprudence looks to customary practice for standards by
which to judge liability issues. 4
Assertions of the authority of professional standards in the
health care system took other forms as well. In addition to offering
peer-review programs to resolve quality/cost trade-offs in light of
professional norms, the organized profession presided over the creation and operation of a closely coordinated system of other standard-setting and certifying bodies. These entities prescribe such
standards as the nature and content of medical education and postgraduate training, the qualifications of medical specialists, the training and credentialihg requirements in the so-called "allied" health
professions, and the internal organization and operation of hospi52. See generally Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 23.
53. The UCR approach.., is ultimately based on the assumption that physicians
on the whole do not abuse their wide pricing discretion and, as ethical practitioners,
charge no more than "reasonable" fees; the "peer-review" approach to limiting professional fees is based on the same unacceptable (in antitrust analysis) premise. If
the private market, in which insurance covers the bulk of the outlays, is to yield
competitive levels of professional fees, private third-party payers must be permitted
and encouraged to take a more direct hand in negotiating fees with individual practitioners or in establishing fee schedules which individual physicians may or may
not accept as adequate compensation for serving patients in the insured group.
Havighurst & Kissam, supra note 28, at 75-76.
54. For general discussions of the standard of care, indicating the strong de facto presumption in favor of those using mainstream methods, see J. KING, THE LAW OF MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE IN A NUTSHELL 39-76 (2d ed. 1985); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW
OF TORTS § 32, at 185-89 (5th ed. 1984); King, In Search of a Standard of Care for the
Medical Profession: The "Accepted Practice" Formula, 28 VAND. L. REV. 1213, 1234-75
(1975); McCoid, The Care Requiredof MedicalPractitioners,12 VAND. L. REv. 549, 605-09
(1959). Cf Havighurst, Altering the Applicable Standard of Care, 49 LAW & CoNTEMP.
PROBS., Spr. 1986, at 256, 266 nn.6-12 (arguing that the customary-practice standard is
adopted for convenience, not because it is necessarily a good guide to appropriate practice);
Havighurst, supra note 51, at 28-41.

1136

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:1117

tals. The profession also sought at one time to prescribe the nature
of private health care financing programs by specifying the characteristics of plans with which physicians could ethically cooperate."5
By these various measures, the medical profession succeeded in
establishing both its claim that doctors know best and its paradigm
of a unitary health care "system ' 5 6 which produces a uniform, scientifically designed product and supplies its own internal mechanisms for standardizing output. Under this paradigm, consumers
are not sovereign decision makers but passive beneficiaries entitled
to whatever services the ostensibly benign system prescribes.
Because health care issues were defined as being purely scientific
and ethical, cost was viewed as an improper consideration in determining the system's appropriate response to a particular medical
problem. A fortiori, the system could not allow cost to affect a consumer's choice regarding medical treatment. Cost was therefore
systematically excluded from the consumer's decision making by a
variety of insurer practices, most of them dictated by law or professional fiat. As a result, the system was able to ignore the marginal
trade-offs between medical care and other things that the consumer
might value. Consumers and lay intermediaries, such as insurers
and hospital boards, were deprived of the opportunity to exercise
their own judgment on such matters, even with independent professional advice. With the medical profession making all the economically important choices, 7 health care claimed each year a
disturbingly larger share of the gross national product.
55. See Havighurst, Professional Restraints on Innovation in Health Care Financing,
1978 DUKE L.J. 303, 306-19 (description of methods used by profession to suppress innovation); Goldberg & Greenberg, The Effect of Physician-ControlledHealth Insurance: United
States v. Oregon State Med. Soc'y, 2 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 48 (1977); Comment, The
American Medical Association: Power,Purpose and Politicsin Organized Medicine, 63 YALE
L.J. 937, 976-96 (1954) (AMA efforts to dictate terms of financial plans).
56. This term, implying central direction, was always employed instead of industry. For
a fuller statement of the dominance of the old paradigm and its recent breakdown, see Havighurst, Private Reform of Tort-law Dogma: Market Opportunities and Legal Obstacles, 49
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spr. 1986, at 143, 145-56.
57. Sociologist Paul Starr has documented the medical profession's rise to a position of
"cultural authority, economic power, and political influence." P. STARR, THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 5 (1982). Charles Weller has shown how the
profession acted as a guild, foisting its own version of free choice without price competition
on a passive public. Weller, "Free Choice" as a Restraint of Trade in American Health Care
Delivery and Insurance, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1351 (1984); Weller, Antitrust and Health Care:
Provider Controlled Health Plans and the Maricopa Decision, 8 AM. J. L. & MED. 233 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Weller, Antitrust and Health Care]. For other surveys of the profession's
domination of its economic environment, see Havighurst, The Doctors' Trust: Self-Regulation and the Law, 3 HEALTH AFF., Fall 1983, at 64; Havighurst, supra note 55.
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Obviously, the model of a monolithic, self-regulating health care
system could not be squared with the procompetitive policies of the
antitrust laws. Consequently, when the health care industry began
to come under antitrust scrutiny following the Supreme Court's
1975 decision in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 8 many of the foundations on which the medical profession's dominance was built began to crumble. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
successfully attacked the ethical codes that limited the ways in
which physicians could market their services.5 9 Successful challenges were also mounted against professional boycotts of HMOs
and of third-party payors that sought to make professionals compete on the basis of price.6 ° Control by powerful professional organizations of prepayment plans was also questioned. 6 These
antitrust initiatives against professional restraints opened the door
for substantial innovations in the delivery and financing of health
care. Payors are today forcing physicians to engage in price
competition. 62
Since the late 1970's, active antitrust enforcement and a congressional disinterest in strengthening public regulation have shifted
power and the responsibility for the overall performance of the
health care industry toward consumers and their agents and away
from government and the industry's self-regulatory mechanisms.
The resulting decentralization of decision making has given consumers a greater voice in the directions taken. These changes in the
locus of decision making have gradually undermined the idea that
there is a single correct way to treat each medical problem, discoverable only in the medical profession's accepted practice and collec58. 421 U.S. 773, 786, 791-92 (1975) (no implied exemption for learned professions;
state bar's minimum fee schedule violates antitrust laws).
59. AMA v. FTC, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 455
U.S. 676 (1982).
60. See, eg., In re Michigan State Med. Soc'y, 101 F.T.C. 191, 254 (1983) (society's
refusal to deal with certain medical insurers held to be restraint of trade); United States v.
Halifax Hosp. Med. Center, 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,151 (1981) (consent decree).
61. See FTC, Statement of Enforcement Policy, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,982, 48,984 (1981);
BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FTC, STAFF REPORT ON MEDICAL PARTICIPATION IN CONTROL OF BLUE SHIELD AND OTHER OPEN-PANEL MEDICAL PREPAYMENT PLANS (Apr.

1979).
62. Cf Ball Memorial Hosp. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 1986);
Brillhart v. Mutual Med. Ins., Inc., 768 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1985) (rejecting challenge to
insurer/physician fee agreements); Kartell v. Blue Shield, 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1984) (rejecting physician complaints about hard bargaining by alleged monopsonist); Rice, de Lissovoy, Gabel & Ermann, The State of PPOs: A National Survey, 4 HEALTH AFF., Winter
1985, at 25 (documenting the growth of plans facilitating physician price competition).
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tive wisdom.6 3
As consumers and their allies have placed cost considerations
alongside quality-of-care concerns, traditional methods of treating
medical problems have been increasingly called into question. As a
result, hospital stays are shorter, occupancy rates are down, and
professional styles of practice are changing."4 In general, consumer
choice is proving to be a useful corrective measure for physicians'
myopic tendency to focus on the presumed benefits of their services
while ignoring the cost and side effects of their ministrations. Increased consumer awareness has also provided new emphasis on
such alternatives as prevention, outpatient services, and nonphysician personnel. 65 Although consumers still value the opinions of
the medical profession, consumer choice is beginning to undermine
the tyranny of professional standards. Professional peer review is
no longer the powerful homogenizing force that it once was.
Although antitrust law has facilitated this revolution 66 in the
ways in which professional services are marketed, it has not yet
challenged all the mechanisms by which the medical profession ef63. For fuller exposition of this breakdown, see Havighurst, supra note 56, at 145-56.
See also Havighurst, supra note 51, at 28-35. Consumers and others are discovering that
medicine is a far less perfect science than has commonly been recognized and that there are
many open questions of efficacy, safety, and cost effectiveness that make diversity and decentralized decision making appropriate. See infra note 65.
64. See, e.g., Davis, Anderson, Renn, Rowland, Schramn & Steinberg, Is Cost Containment Working?, 4 HEALTH AFF., Fall 1985, at 81.
65. Questions about the consistency and reliability-and indeed about the scientific basis-of professional norms and standards are being increasingly raised, with the result that
medicine is being demystified. See, eg., Variations in Medical Practice, 3 HEALTH AFF.,
Summer 1984 (focusing on the work of John Wennberg, M.D., showing wide inconsistencies
in medical practices from area to area); Eddy, Clinical Policies and the Quality of Clinical
Practice,307 NEw ENG. J. MED. 343 (1982) (documenting the view that "there is reason to
believe that there are flaws in the process by which the profession generates clinical policies").
66. See, e.g., Havighurst, The ContributionsofAntitrust Law to a ProcompetitiveHealth
Policy, in MARKET REFORMS IN HEALTH CARE 295-96 (J. Meyer ed. 1983). The "revolution" is far from complete, but its progress is suggested by the following thoughts of an
opinion pollster:
Historians looking back on the 1980s will report that the nation's health care
system was profoundly changed during this decade. They will note... increasing
competition among health care providers; fundamental changes in delivery of
health care services and in the institutions that deliver them; and a revolution in the
way that health care services are sold and paid for. They may also be able to note
that- after years of escalating health care costs- private sector costs were brought
under control. And, if they are perceptive, they will report that the public's behavior, attitudes, and expectations about health care providers also shifted dramatically.
Some things have not changed, including our priorities. Americans want a
health care system that provides first-rate care with a human face, that is accessible
to everyone, including the old and the poor, and that is affordable.
Taylor, Healing the Health Care System, PUB. OPINION, Aug.-Sept. 1985, at 16.
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fectively standardizes health care institutions, personnel, and services. Accrediting and credentialing programs are now forced to
account for the reasonableness of their standards and for the way in
which they are applied in particular cases.67 The legitimacy of these
programs is generally accepted, however, and in the final analysis
their actions enjoy substantial deference. One reason for the acceptance of these programs is that standardization is not undesirable per
se and indeed can enhance efficiency in a market characterized by
consumer ignorance and insurance-induced distortions in behavior.
On the other hand, enforcement agencies and private plaintiffs have
not raised any concern about the profession's near-monopoly of
standard setting, accrediting, and certification. If the desirability of
competition in the production of such information and opinion were
recognized, many professional activities aimed at giving the public
only a single, professionally validated opinion on a particular issue
might be open to a new kind of antitrust challenge.6"
Because profession-dominated peer review was historically an
important element in the infrastructure of controls by which the
medical profession retained vital decisions in its own hands, it must
be reexamined in light of the specific concern that excessive standardization may deprive consumers of options that they should be
allowed to exercise in a free, competitive market. If professional
peer review still serves to disenfranchise consumers and to remove
important issues of price and value from the competitive arena, it
may yet violate the Sherman Act. The ultimate issue, however, is
whether such professional activities are consistent with the decentralization of decision making that is the essential element of a competitive market and, therefore, the essential concern of antitrust
law. The next three sections of this Article consider distinct anticompetitive effects and suggest legal rules that can preserve the
benefits of peer review while protecting against the hazards
observed.
V.

EFFECTS OF PEER REVIEW ON COMPETITION AMONG ITS
PROFESSIONAL SPONSORS

Antitrust law's first concern with respect to competitor collabo67. See, eg., Kreuzer v. American Academy of Periodontology, 735 F.2d 1479, 1489
(D.C. Cir. 1984). See generally Havighurst & King, supra note 26, at 169-84 (arguing for
judicial restraint).
68. See Havighurst & King, supra note 48, at 295-325 (applying antitrust principles to
restraints on the production of data and opinion informing purchases in health care); see also
infra text accompanying notes 112-20.
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ration is its effect on competition among the collaborators themselves. Profession-sponsored peer review might perhaps be
challenged for its adverse effects on such competition on the basis of
the Supreme Court's holding in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society.69 In that case, the Court found that two broadly based
foundations for medical care committed per se violations of the
Sherman Act when they bound their members to charge no more
than agreed-upon prices to patients insured by foundation-approved
health insurance plans. Although these voluntary fee limits can be
viewed as cost-containment measures responsive to public concern
about the excessive charges of some physicians, the Court condemned them as simple price fixing.7 ° A profession-sponsored peerreview body enunciating standards for judging the pricing or provision of medical care might be viewed in comparable fashion. Competitors promulgating such standards, the argument could go, stand
on the same footing as the defendants in the Maricopa case because
they are tampering with physicians' pricing or output decisions."1
69. 457 U.S. 332 (1982). Because it was decided by a bare four to three majority (Justices Blackmun and O'Connor not participating), this case may be weak authority for applying strict antitrust rules to concerted activity of professionals.
70. The dissenting opinion in Maricopacharacterized the challenged medical care plan
as "a comparatively new method of providing insured medical services at predetermined
maximum costs" and observed that "the plan seems to be in the public interest." Id. at 357.
The majority accepted as true the defendants' claim that the maximum fee schedule "serve[d]
as an effective cost containment mechanism that ha[d] saved patients and insurers millions of
dollars." Id. at 342. It concluded, however, that the Sherman Act was " 'grounded on faith
in price competition as a market force [and not] on a policy of low selling prices at the price
of eliminating competition.'" Id. at 348 (quoting Rahl, Price Competition and the Price Fixing Rule -Preface and Perspective, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 137, 142 (1962)).
It would seem fortunate that the majority carried the day and refuted the once-prevalent
idea that the organized medical profession is collectively responsible for solving the problem
of health care costs. For advocacy of this result and a demonstration that professional efforts
are unlikely to save consumers money in fact, see Havighurst & Hackbarth, supra note 15.
The dissenting justices in Maricopa also criticized the majority's application of the per se
rule to the medical plans. See 457 U.S. at 357, 361-65. This criticism was also voiced by
many commentators. See e.g., Gerhart, The Supreme Court and Antitrust Analysis: The
(Near)Triumph of the ChicagoSchool, 1982 Sup. Cr. REV. 319, 344-48 (wooden application
of per se rule seen as retrogressive); Easterbrook, Maximum PriceFixing, 48 U. CH. L. REV.
886, 900-08 (1981) (application of per se rule is inappropriate absent examination of benefits
of maximum price fixing). Although criticism of Justice Stevens' statement of principles is
justified, the result he reached and the analytical method actually employed- examining the
claim of procompetitiveness after seeming to say that the Court lacked power to do so (457
U.S. at 351-54)-are both defensible. See, e.g., Weller, Antitrust and Health Care,supra note
57, at 233-42; Leffler, Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society: Maximum-PriceAgreements in Markets with Insured Buyers, 2 Sup. Cr. EcON. REV. 187, 189 (1983) (correct result
but automatic application of per se rule inappropriate).
71. Because price and output are related, so that agreements increasing one reduce the
other and vice versa, both should be of equal antitrust concern. "Restrictions on price and
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The Maricopa case does not, however, resolve the legal status of
professional peer review. The specific vice that led to condemnation
of the maximum fee schedules in that case was the explicit agreement of the foundation members to adhere to the prescribed maximums. Peer-review bodies do not, as a general rule, bind their
members (or anyone else) to adhere to the standards they set. Instead, standards are ostensibly established only for the purpose of
reviewing particular bills or services or a particular physician's performance. If the findings of these reviews are given effect only
through the actions of independent decision makers, there is no basis, as there was in Maricopa,for finding a naked agreement of competitors to surrender their competitive freedom. Instead, physicians
retain their freedom to charge fees that the peer reviewers may not
approve, to prescribe services that the peer reviewers may find unnecessary, and to provide a quality of service that the peer reviewers
would declare substandard. If a true horizontal restraint is to be
discovered, one must either look more deeply or look elsewhere.
A deeper look at profession-sponsored peer review does reveal a
problem when the reviewers go beyond evaluating care on an ad
hoc, retrospective basis and promulgate advisory fee schedules or
ethical practice standards to guide future professional conduct. The
most troublesome possibility is that such standards reflect or invite
actual or tacit agreement by the sponsoring professionals to abide
by them or to boycott those who do not abide. Even if no such
agreement to follow or to enforce the standards is discoverable, a
peer-review program still embodies concerted action subject to antitrust scrutiny. Where the members of a useful joint venture collectively possess market power, courts can require that they carry out
their beneficial activities in ways that pose no undue hazard to competition.7 2 Some implications of this rule will be noted below.
output are the paradigmatic examples of restraints of trade that the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit." National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 104 S.Ct. 2948,
2964 (1984). See also United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940)
("Under the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stablizing ... price ... is illegal per se."). For these
reasons, output-limiting utilization standards, even for cost-containment purposes, might be
even more troublesome to an antitrust court than maximum fee control. It is notable, however, that the foundations' utilization-review activities were not challenged and seemed unimpeachable to the court of appeals. Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 643 F.2d 553,
557 (9th Cir. 1980) ("No one suggests that peer [utilization] review is suspect .... ").
72. Eg., Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963) (discussed infra notes
100-03 and accompanying text); United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351 (5th
Cir. 1980). The less-restrictive-alternative requirement is a sound one but should be viewed
as a test for an arrangement's basic reasonableness, not as an invitation to courts to regulate
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Do Collective StandardsImply a HorizontalAgreement to
Abide by Them?

Although collective standard setting does not inevitably involve
an agreement by the sponsors to compete only in ways that meet
professional approval, it may easily involve such an agreement in
fact. It is extremely difficult for the parties to a collective standardsetting effort to maintain in practice the distinction between lawfully agreeing to promulgate standards and unlawfully agreeing not
to deviate from them.73 Courts would be hard pressed to detect
whether the distinction had been observed in a particular case. Because authoritative standards invite professionals mutually to refrain from unapproved competitive methods and because courts
could never be certain whether uniform compliance reflected unilateral choice or collective action,74 it may be too simplistic to presume that professionally promulgated standards are merely
advisory and affect professional conduct only through the independent actions of those who unilaterally decide to respect them.
Because, at some point, the effort to distinguish between an
agreement to set standards and an agreement to adhere to them becomes strained, it may be more honest to consider the possibility
that some intraprofessional agreements to establish and abide by
minimum standards of performance should be tolerated by antitrust
law. Such an exception to the statute's flat prohibition of "[elvery
...restraint of trade" has frequently been suggested as a way of
recognizing the special character of professional services.7 5 Conall collective action. See P. AREEDA, supra note 11, at 9; Havighurst & King, supra note 26,
at 178-84.
73. For a discussion of this distinction in another context (educational accrediting), see
Havighurst & King, supra note 48, at 308-11. See also In re National Macaroni Mfr. Ass'n.,
65 FTC 583 (1964), aff'd, 345 F.2d 421, 426 (7th Cir. 1965) (prohibiting standard setting
that amounts to an agreement among association members to reduce the proportion of durum
wheat in macaroni in an effort to depress the price of that component).
74. Proving the requisite collusion requires more than a showing of "conscious parallelism." See Theatre Enter., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954).
Parallel conduct attributable to oligopolistic interdependence may be unlawful even if an
actual agreement to refrain from competitive behavior cannot be inferred. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 222, 223 (1939). An inference of actual or tacit
collusion is generally recognized as permissible where the parallel conduct would be contrary
to the self-interest of each individual competitor unless all competitors acted in the same
manner. See Ambook Enter. v. Time, Inc., 612 F.2d 604, 614 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. dismissed,
448 U.S. 914 (1980). In the professional setting, where individual professionals might act
against economic self-interest for personal or ethical reasons, these usual tests for establishing
conspiracies are particularly difficult to apply. See infra note 83.
75. Courts have occasionally indicated a willingness to extend special treatment to professionals under the antitrust laws by excusing restraints imposed for ethical or public-service
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ceivably a worthy purpose might be allowed to justify some restraints without throwing open the door entirely to unguided policy
judgments about whether competition is desirable in every case.76
Indeed, it can be argued that if the law does no more than make
allowance for the reality that markets are imperfect, it leaves the
underlying paradigm of competition unchallenged.77 Unlike the
public-safety claims offered in support of an ethical canon against
competitive bidding for professional engineering services in the
leading case rejecting worthy-purpose defenses, a narrow marketfailure defense for an agreement to adhere to a profession's official
practice standards might escape being characterized
as "a frontal
78
assault on the basic policy of the Sherman Act."1
Its sweeping language notwithstanding, the Sherman Act has
never been construed to condemn all naked, nonancillary restraints.7 9 One reason for not automatically condemning all agreements under which competitors nakedly limit the methods by which
they compete might be simply that antitrust law, if it is to retain
credibility as national policy, ought not to appear mindless in its
attachment to competition. Partly for this reason, the antitrust enforcement agencies have always been willing to listen to claims that
small infringements on competition serve consumer interests. In
addition to protecting the enforcers against the charge that they are
wedded to competition as an end in itself and not as an instrument
reasons. See, eg., National Socy of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
696 (1978) (dictum); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788-89 n.17 (1975) (dictum); Wilk v. AMA, 719 F.2d 207, 221-22 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 2398
(1984); Indiana Fed'n of Dentists v. FTC, 745 F.2d 1124, 1139 (7th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 106 S.
Ct. 2009 (1986). No court has yet articulated a doctrinally sound way to make such exceptions, however. The ensuing text suggests a possibility but concludes that an exception is not
needed and that clear thinking about whether competition is actually being harmed will serve
the same purpose better and create less uncertainty.
76. See supra note 15 for the arguments against a worthy-purpose defense.
77. The suggestion is that a limited and principled exception to the rule requiring unrestricted rivalry might be made in cases where the theory underlying the policy of promoting
competition is invalidated by the presence of a demonstrable market failure and where the
restraint in question could reasonably be expected to make actual market outcomes resemble
more closely the outcomes in an efficient market. See P. AREEDA, supra note 11, at 5-8. It is
possible that the need for such an exception is more theoretical than real, however, and that
real-world competitors could seldom be trusted to make the imperfect market serve consumer
interests better. See infra note 82. Although Areeda offers a hypothetical case that seems .to
warrant an exception (see id. at 7-8, 11), he has found no comparable example of a proconsumer naked trade restraint in actuality.
78. National Soc'y of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978).
The Court in this case implied that, if the restraint had aimed at protecting only unsophisticated purchasers of complex services, it might have been viewed differently. See id. at 692.
79. See P. AREEDA, supra note 11, at 5-8.
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for advancing consumer welfare, such openness gives the impression of flexibility in the law and thus weakens arguments for creating unwise statutory exemptions. Moreover, horizontal agreements
to observe minimum standards often appear to reduce the need for
government regulation or to compensate for inadequate regulation
(by state licensing boards, for example) and thus to be desirable
from a policy standpoint. Finally, the standards adopted often approximate the standards that the law itself imposes,8 ° and it is hard
to see any reason why antitrust law should object to competitor
agreements to obey the law and monitor each other's compliance. 8 '
Despite the foregoing arguments, it does not seem necessary or
appropriate, at least in this instance,82 to tolerate explicit intraprofessional agreements to abide by ethical or practice standards.
80. See, e.g., In re AMA, 94 F.T.C. 980 (1979), modified and enforced sub nom. AMA
v. FTC, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd men . by an equally divided Court, 455 U.S. 676
(1982). Even though it found the AMA and local societies guilty of Sherman Act violations
in restricting professional advertising, the Commission's final order nevertheless left the societies an opportunity to prohibit "representations... that [it] reasonably believes would be
false or deceptive within the meaning of Section 5 of the [FTC] Act." 638 F.2d at 452.
Possible problems surrounding this order are discussed infra note 82.
81. In Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941), an association of women's apparel distributors, designers, and manufacturers sought to prevent the
unauthorized copying of fashion designs, which the Court assumed would be tortious conduct under state law. See id. at 468. Nevertheless, the Court, in declaring the Guild's conduct unlawful as a group boycott, characterized the Guild as "an extra-governmental agency,
which prescribes rules for the regulation and restraint of interstate commerce." Id. at 465.
The assumption of power to enforce "the law" creates dangers of selective enforcement and
self-interested misinterpretation. See infra note 82.
82. Even if room exists in antitrust theory for offering narrow market-failure defenses
for minor anticompetitive agreements (see supra note 77), such agreements by powerful professional groups should seldom be upheld. Analysis of them under the Rule of Reason should
usually lead to the conclusion that the risks to consumers stemming from the professionals'
inevitable conflict-of-interests outweigh the likelihood that their restraints will achieve true
efficiency-that is, outcomes similar to those that would be yielded if the market functioned
smoothly.
The FTC's order allowing the AMA to police false and deceptive advertising (see supra
note 80) illustrates this risk. One could argue that such policing is procompetitive in that it
rectifies a demonstrable market failure. However, the Commission's own demonstration of
the medical profession's past hostility to competitive advertising demonstrates the unlikelihood that the profession would in fact use self-regulation to increase consumer confidence in
professional advertising, thereby increasing such advertising's effectiveness as a competitive
tool available to professionals. Furthermore, although it may appear that the FTC's order
grants only narrow authority to enforce the FTC Act, the actual power granted may be quite
broad because of the difficulty in detecting enforcement abuses and because of the "breathing
space" necessarily afforded legitimate self-regulators by the courts. See Silver v. New York
Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 360 (1962). Note also that the final order approved by the
court of appeals permits the AMA to prohibit whatever it "reasonably believes" would be
deceptive. 638 F.2d at 452. Because of the potential for abuse, even the power to agree not to
compete by advertising deceptively may be too great to tolerate.
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The procompetitive benefits of professional peer review may be obtained under a stricter rule that prohibits agreements to abide by
standards but is not too quick to infer the existence of such agreements' 83from circumstantial evidence, such as "conscious parallelism."
Although many voluntary standards are beneficial enough
to competition to warrant overlooking any implicit agreement by
their sponsors to refrain from unapproved conduct, it would be unsound doctrine and policy to go further and tolerate explicit intraprofessional agreements on the forms that competition may take.
Such a concession to professional authority would perpetuate the
belief that professional groups, rather than consumer choice, should
finally dictate industry performance.
Under the foregoing formulation of the legal test, ethical and
practice standards could be adopted by influential professional bodies without being viewed as the product of the sponsors' agreement
to compete only in approved ways. Peer reviewers would have to
present their standards, however, as being only advisory and not as
professionally revealed truth. Although there are good reasons to
disregard the irreducible element of agreement implicit in the promulgation of such standards, the law should insist that the standard
setters preserve appearances of nonagreement as far as it is possible
to do so. Thus, under the requirement that powerful competitor
organizations must pursue their legitimate purposes by less restrictive or less dangerous means reasonably available to them, the peer
reviewers should be barred from holding out their standards and
enforcement actions as anything more than recommendations for
the use of appropriate decisionmakers. When uniformity results, it
should then be at least plausible to argue that it resulted only from
supply and demand factors, not from explicit agreements to forgo
certain behavior.
B.

The Form of Collective Standards

Under the rule that competitors' collective actions for procompetitive purposes should be tailored to endanger competition as little as reasonably possible, peer reviewers' standards must be written
and published in ways that are unlikely to dampen the vigor of com83. For a case in which the FTC seemed to jump too quickly to the conclusion that a
conspiracy existed, see In re Community Blood Bank of the Kansas City Area, Inc., 70
F.T.C. 728, 938-42 (1966), rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1969). Dissenting
Commissioner Elman, while correctly criticizing the majority's inference of a conspiracy
from respondent professionals' behavior, was himself too willing to forgive a professional
boycott to suppress commercial blood banks. See id. at 951-58; see supra note 74.
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petition among sponsors of the program. For example, fee review,
though useful to consumers and insurers as a grievance mechanism,
would pose substantial dangers to competition if it employed an announced fee schedule or fee-setting formula that practitioners could
easily use to set noncompetitive prices.84 Fortunately, the danger
that fee review will trigger pricing uniformity can easily be minimized by reviewing fees only on an ad hoe, retrospective basis and
by eschewing publication of fee schedules or formulas.
The antitrust authorities appear to accept retrospective fee review that constitutes advice only to payors, not providers.8 5 Thus,
the FTC and the Justice Department have issued advisory opinions
approving profession-sponsored, fee-review programs that (1) refrain from publishing their standards as a possible invitation to
providers to increase their below-ceiling prices and (2) do nothing
to force patients and insurers to employ the peer reviewers to the
exclusion of other cost-containment methods.86 Peer reviewers
84. See supra note 28.
85. Bartholomew v. Virginia Chiropractors Ass'n, 612 F.2d 812, 817-18 (4th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938 (1980) (allowing professional association to advise insurers on
whether fees meet UCR criteria); Mize v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 1984-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,780 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 19, 1983) (chiropractic peer review committee's
review of fees not a conspiracy to fix prices where merely advisory to an insurer). See also
infra note 86. Other suggestive authorities include Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S.
773, 781 (1975) ("purely advisory fee schedule.., a different question"); AMA v. FTC, 638
F.2d 443, 453 (2d Cir. 1980) (modifying FTC order so as not "to impinge upon valid activity
such as professional peer review of the fee practices of physicians"), aff'd mem. by an equally
divided Court, 455 U.S. 676 (1982); United States v. American Soc'y of Anesthesiologists,
Inc., 473 F. Supp. 147, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (accepting Society's relative value formula for
pricing services because it was advisory only, despite evidence it had been used for local price
fixing).
Although the latter decision seems wrong in its evaluation of benefits and harms and its
refusal to apply a per se rule following a "quick look," there is ample support for the principle that advisory peer review should not be unlawful if properly structured and confined to
serving that purpose. Commentators supporting this general conclusion include Borsody &
Tiano, supra note 25, at 523-31; Note, supra note 25, at 57-67.
86. See, e.g., Iowa Dental Ass'n, 99 F.T.C. 648, 649-50 (1982) (advisory opinion); Letter
from Donald I. Baker, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice to J. Brian
Niederhauser, International Chiropractor Ass'n, Mar. 1977 (business review letter) (copy on
file with author); Letter from M. Elizabeth Gee, Assistant Director, Bureau of Competition,
FTC, to William T. McGuire, Passaic County Med. Soc'y, Jan. 3, 1986 (expressing the FTC
staff's doubts concerning a fee-review program mandatory for and binding on society members) (copy on file with author); Letter from Arthur N. Lerner, Assistant Director, Bureau of
Competition, FTC, to American Podiatry Ass'n, Aug. 19, 1983 (approving fee-review program) (copy on file with author); United States v. Illinois Podiatry Soc'y, 1977-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 1 61,767 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (consent decree barring relative value guides but permitting
advisory peer review). For provisions in FTC orders leaving room for peer review of fees, see
In re American Med. Ass'n, 99 F.T.C. 440, 441 (Final Order, § II, May 19, 1982); Michigan
State Med. Soc'y, 101 F.T.C. 191, 314 (Final Order, § III, Feb. 17, 1982). These orders and
several other recent FTC actions have indicated a willingness (partly in recognition of first
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should have no difficulty in abiding by these rules in policing excessive professional fees. In the present climate of the health care industry, insurers are less likely than in earlier days to rely exclusively
upon profession-sponsored fee review. Payors are increasingly negotiating fees with physicians directly in advance, using the preferred-provider designation to steer patients away from high-priced
practitioners. 7
Utilization review would likewise present a possible antitrust

problem if it entailed the publication of profession-approved practice standards that invited practitioners to tailor their practice styles
according to collective preferences rather than individual judgment.
Nevertheless, it is hard to see any great threat to competition if the
standards are only advisory.88 The danger of inducing uniform provider behavior would seem substantially less than in the case of fee
recommendations. In addition, the possible harm to consumers

from receiving costly added services of small marginal utility is not
as offensive to antitrust policy as the risk of noncompetitive prices.
Even if a particular insurer were to adopt a profession-sponsored peer-review body as the final arbiter, and its standards as the
final measure, of its payment responsibilities, there would be no antitrust violation. The insurer's decision, if freely made, could be
presumed to reflect the insurer's choice of a competitive strategy,

subject ultimately to the verdict of the marketplace. This decision
is reversible if the insurer or its customers should lose confidence in
amendment rights) to permit professional organizations to engage in discussions of fee-related
issues with third-party payors. E.g., id. (§§ III-B and III-C); California Med. Ass'n, 3 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 22, 243 (Apr. 24, 1985) (modification of consent decree); American Soc'y
of Internal Med., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 22, 242 (Apr. 19, 1985) (similar); American
Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 3 Trade Reg. Rep. - 22, 240 (Apr. 4, 1985) (similar); American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 104 F.T.C. 524 (1984) (similar); Hawaii v.
Hawaii Soc'y of Anesthesiologists, 1981-2 Trade Cas. - 64, 164 (Hawaii Cir. Ct. 1981) (consent decree under state antitrust law permitting society to advocate payment systems to third
party payors).
87. The difficult cases will be those in which fee controls that are arguably ancillary to
the operation of a procompetitive joint venture are questioned because of the joint venture's
size and potential for impairing competition in the market as a whole. The Supreme Court,
in Maricopa, made clear that integrated plans will not be exposed to per se treatment. See
457 U.S. at 355-57. The developing law on so-called "preferred provider" organizations and
similar arrangements has explored this and related issues. E.g., Ball Memorial Hosp. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 1986); Brillhart v. Mutual Med. Ins., Inc., 768
F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1985); Health Care Management Assocs., 101 F.T.C. 1014 (1983) (advisory opinion); Remarks of J. Paul McGrath, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of
Justice, before the 33rd Annual ABA Antitrust Spring Meeting (Mar. 22, 1985).
88. See Rhode Island Professional Standards Review Org., 101 F.T.C. 1010 (1983)
(FTC advisory opinion approving PSRO's private utilization program, which was advisory
only and could, in the FTC's view, "promote competition").
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the peer reviewers. As long as competing health plans are free to
define the limits of their coverage by other means, consumers would
not be deprived of the benefits of competition among the sponsors of
the peer-review effort.
VI.

EFFECTS OF PEER REVIEW ON THE COMPETITIVE

FREEDOM AND OPPORTUNITIES OF THIRD PARTIES

In view of the role of peer review in operating the old medical
monopoly, antitrust analysis should not stop with the discovery that
profession-sponsored peer review is a procompetitive source of information and advice that does not impair horizontal competition
among its professional sponsors. Peer reviewers may so dominate
the provision of information and advice that competitors outside
the sponsoring group or other participants in the market, including
those standing in a vertical relationship to the sponsors, have no
real alternative to accepting their prescriptions. Consumers may
therefore be denied options that they might deem desirable. If a
joint venture enjoys such pervasive influence, 9 its activities must be
further scrutinized to ensure that the collaborators' purpose is indeed procompetitive and that their actions are taken in ways that
minimize any danger to competition. Even if these tests are passed,
the ability of the collaborators to preempt independent decision
making by others could still be deemed sufficient to render the net
effect of the peer-review program anticompetitive.
In the following discussions, profession-sponsored peer review
for cost-containment purposes is treated separately from qualityoriented peer review because the potential harms to competition in
the two cases take somewhat different forms.
A.

Peer Review for Cost Containment: Fee and Utilization
Review

Historically, there was a substantial danger that private health
insurers would unanimously embrace the medical profession's pre89. See supra text accompanying notes 7-10 for the significance of market power in § 1
analysis. For present purposes, a distinction may be drawn between the market in which a
peer-review body's sponsoring physicians compete and the market in which the peer-review
body itself "competes." Power in the market for physician services may be created by the
joint venture in question, but this is not the market power of concern in the remainder of this
analysis. Instead, the joint venture should be scrutinized to determine whether it possesses
power over the production of a specific type of information and opinion, the misuse of which
could indirectly harm consumers. See generally infra text accompanying notes 112-20; Havighurst & King, supra note 48, at 299-300.
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ferred methods of fee and utilization review, eschewing alternative
methods of controlling their costs and in effect letting the profession
dictate overall spending. Although this danger has diminished as
competition has intensified, such unanimity could still appear in a
given local market, warranting an antitrust investigation. If profession-sponsored peer review is instrumental in curbing insurers'
competitive independence and thus protecting physicians from
competitive pressures, antitrust law might be invoked to rectify the
situation.
It appears that insurer competition in the containment of medical care costs is most likely to be suppressed by means other than
mere profession sponsorship of fee or utilization review. Thus, insurers may have been overtly coerced to do business only in physician-approved ways. 90 The coercive measures should then be
challenged directly, and the peer-review program should be disbanded or reconstituted only upon a showing that it was an instrumental part of a larger conspiracy. If coercion by providers is
absent, the insurers' uniform acceptance of provider standards and
decision making should be scrutinized to determine whether such
"conscious parallelism" in forgoing efficacious competitive strategies was the product of unlawful insurer collusion, actual or tacit. 91
Evidence that the peer reviewers organized or actively facilitated
such collusion could make them guilty of antitrust violations as
well.
In the past, noncompetitive conditions persisted at the interface
between physicians and private third-party payors without much
detectable coercion or collusion. Instead, the prevailing peace and
harmony appeared to reflect a largely tacit but highly stable accommodation between a profession wishing to avoid price competition
and an industry wishing to preserve its traditional insurance practices and to avoid competing in cost containment. 92 This informal
alliance to suppress competitive impulses on both sides of the market 93 has dissolved in many markets today as a result of pressures
from cost-conscious employers, the new competitiveness of physi90. See infra text accompanying notes 115-18.
91. On proving conspiracy by circumstantial evidence, see supra note 74. For a review
of the state of competition in markets for health insurance, see Havighurst, Explaining the
Questionable Cost-Containment Record of Commercial Health Insurers, in THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF HEALTH CARE (H.E. Frech ed.) (in press).
92. See id.
93. Maricopa provides an illustration. The foundation's maximum fee schedules bound
physicians only when dealing with patients of approved insurers, which meant that insurers
had to satisfy the doctors or face higher costs. See 457 U.S. at 353-54. Although the dissent-
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cians, and antitrust inhibitions on the profession's own cost-control
efforts, which have forced payors to assume unwanted cost-containment responsibilities themselves.9 4 Nevertheless, there may still be
markets in which competitive forces remain dormant and in which
profession-sponsored fee and utilization review serve as the only detectable linchpin in the noncompetitive framework. In such a case,
collective peer review could be condemned by a Rule of Reason
finding that, in the particular circumstances, the harms to competition outweigh peer review's benefits.
Without near-universal adherence to the peer-reviewers' costcontainment program, profession-sponsored fee or utilization review easily meets the simple specifications laid down earlier and
should be seen as fundamentally procompetitive and lawful.
B. Peer Review for Quality Assurance
Peer review may frequently limit the freedom of action of individual physicians who compete with the peer reviewers and their
professional sponsors. Such effects are especially likely in the case
of profession-sponsored quality assurance in local health care markets. Individual competitors may suffer not just denial of an insurance payment but actual exclusion from practice, perhaps because
various actors, relying upon the peer reviewers' judgment, refuse to
deal with them. Although harm to an individual competitor is not
itself a harm to competition, competitors who maintain a program
capable of excluding other competitors from the market may be in a
position to discourage competitive conduct or to exclude enough
competitors to create market power. On the other hand, protecting
consumers against substandard providers and substandard practice
is a valuable social benefit. Indeed, so long as this benefit is
achieved only by informing appropriate decision makers, qualityoriented peer review should be viewed favorably under antitrust
policy. Unfortunately, its benefits are not easily obtained without
running some risk that competition will be impaired.
The primary risk to competition here is again that provider performance will be dictated by professional fiat, denying consumers
desirable market options. This hazard of undue standardization
does not arise if the peer reviewers limit themselves to retrospective
evaluations which identifies true incompetence and simple carelessing justices thought that insurers could be trusted to protect consumer interests, that argument assumed a competitive insurance market. See id. at 360-61.
94. See supra note 70.
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ness. Effective quality assurance, however, may require peer reviewers to adopt explicit, prospective standards of acceptable
practice.95 Such professionally promulgated quality standards,
backed by the possibility of exclusion from the market, present a
real danger that physicians' clinical methods will be centrally determined, contrary to the premises of the antitrust laws. With such
standards in place, doctors' fears of malpractice suits, of action by
licensing authorities, of collegial criticism, and of bad publicity
push them strongly toward conformity.
Quality-related standards could undoubtedly serve as a vehicle
for suppressing responsible innovation in medical practice. For example, a peer-review body might declare substandard certain practices that have not been affirmatively shown to be inferior to
accepted methods but that economize enough on physician services
to inspire professional opposition. Another possibility is that a professional norm might be entirely valid as a guide to "best" medical
practice but should not bind all practitioners, because it makes inadequate allowance for cost considerations or patient preferences.
Finally, a medical cartel could employ improper standards or selective enforcement to discipline and discourage particular competitors. For example, if community doctors, disliking HMOs,
subjected them and their physicians to unreasonable rules or special
scrutiny, HMOs might have to modify their practice style to such
an extent that consumers would be deprived of desirable options. 96
There is enough evidence to cast doubt upon the reliability of professional norms and standards as an exclusive guide to efficient
medical practice97 that antitrust law's concern about excessive
standardization and control of medical practice should be taken
seriously.
If it is to tolerate professional quality assurance at all, antitrust
law must find ways of preventing the anticompetitive use of the
power to label a practitioner as incompetent or neglectful of patient
welfare. Issues can perhaps best be structured by analogy to the
essential-facilities doctrine. Competitors who collectively control
their competitors' access to some resource vital to their survival in
the marketplace are held to a degree of accountability for the man95. Indeed, the use of written standards may be desirable as a means of ensuring that the
program is being administered in an evenhanded, as opposed to an anticompetitive, fashion.
96. See Havighurst & Bovbjerg, Professional Standards Review Organizations and
HealthMaintenance Organizations: Are They Compatible?, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 381, 401-21
(discussing conflicting interests and contrasting styles of medical practice).
97. See supra note 65.
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ner in which they exercise that power. 9 8 Antitrust law, recognizing
the procompetitive benefits of the collaboration, does not condemn
the concerted action outright but instead insists that the collaborators adopt methods that create no greater threat to competition

than is reasonably necessary to achieve those benefits. Although
peer reviewers exercise only influence, not control, over the decisions that affect their competitors' welfare, the analogy to the paradigmatic essential-facilities case is clear. The crucial issue is simply
how deeply courts should probe in evaluating the collaborators' specific procedures, standards, and actions. The operative legal presumptions, tests, and remedies should not unduly jeopardize the
peer reviewers' efficiency-enhancing activities.
As an embodiment of the Rule of Reason, the essential-facilities
doctrine leaves considerable room for judgment in assessing a particular collaboration and for tailoring the court's intervention in
proportion to the risk of anticompetitive harm. 99 The case of Silver
v. New York Stock Exchangeo is authority for requiring that a
powerful, self-regulatory organization adopt fair procedures in administering its standards. Profession-sponsored bodies engaged in
quality-oriented peer review should be likewise required to give a
98. See, eg., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 13 (1945) (dominant newspooling association of newspapers); United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383, 39798 (1912) (joint railroad control of sole river crossing); United States v. Realty Multi-List,
Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1355 (5th Cir. 1980) (multiple listing service); Gamco, Inc. v. Providence
Fruit & Produce Bldg., Inc., 194 F.2d 484, 486-89 (lst Cir.) (joint control of favorably located warehouse), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 817 (1952). Regarding competitor collaboration in
research-and-development joint ventures, see DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE
CONCERNING RESEARCH JoIr VENTURES 21-23 (Nov. 1980) (indicating that a dominant
venture, if lawful at all, would not be allowed to exclude competitors arbitrarily). For detailed application of the essential-facilities doctrine to a closely analogous situation-the allocation of hospital staff privileges by a medical staff--see Havighurst, supra note 15, at I 11125.
99. In addition, it serves as a reminder that collective possession, or even exercise, of
the power to harm competitors is not in itself an antitrust violation and that procompetitive
joint ventures of powerful competitors may be lawful if they are strucutred and operated in
ways that are reasonably compatible with competition. Because profession-sponsored peerreview programs are analogous to such legitimate joint ventures, they should also enjoy the
benefit of the doubt when their day-to-day actions are subjected to antitrust review. As legitimate, procompetitive sources of useful information and advice, they should not be placed in
jeopardy of paying treble damages for every slip up. As the Supreme Court acknowledged in
Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 360 (1963), a legitimate, competitorsponsored body in a position to affect the welfare of other competitors must be allowed some
"breathing space;" otherwise, the public will be denied the very benefits that justify the body's
existence. It is useful to remember, too, that tort law ran supply remedies for unfair business
conduct that does not threaten the competitive process, making it unnecessary to stretch
antitrust law to police simple unfairness.
100. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
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party subject to pending peer-review action notice of the issues, an
opportunity to present evidence and counterarguments, and the
benefit of an unbiased panel of decision makers.'0 1 A peer-review
body that fails to adopt procedures that reduce the danger of biased,
anticompetitive actions should be subject, not to per se liability as
was called for in the special circumstances of Silver,10 2 but to close
judicial scrutiny. Such scrutiny should entail a full trial on the merits of the action taken with neither special deference to the professional body nor any presumption of its good faith.
If a peer-review program is administered procedurally to minimize potential harms to competition, the level of judicial scrutiny
should reflect due recognition by the court of the program's
procompetitive, information-generating benefits. Although the peer
reviewers' standards are open to substantive evaluation to ensure
that they are rationally related to the objective of quality assurance,
a court should resist the impulse to go further to make sure that
they are the best possible standards or at least substantively good
ones. An antitrust courtroom is not the place to resolve such issues.103 Precisely because the court cannot define a proper technical standard or even know whether a single standard would be
socially desirable, it should refrain from making any such inquiry.
It should also not conceive its function as giving affirmative approval to the peer reviewers or their standards. Such a judicial imprimatur could only increase the peer reviewers' credibility
(perhaps already excessive) in the eyes of the public and dispel ap101. The Silver rationale seems to fit the circumstances of both statutory and nonstatutory peer review:
[The] aims of the statutory scheme of self-policing-to protect investors and promote fair dealing-are defeated when an exchange exercises its tremendous economic power without explaining its basis for acting.... The requirement of [notice
and hearing] will... help in effectuating antitrust policies by discouraging anticompetitive applications of exchange rules which are not justifiable as within the scope
of the... Exchange Act.
Id. at 361-62. The principle invoked is the less-restrictive-alternative requirement. See supra
note 72. The requirement of an unbiased panel of decision makers is suggested by Gibson v.
Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 578-79 (1973).
102. In Silver, the Court found that the defendants, not having employed fair procedures,
were guilty of a per se violation and therefore barred from even offering evidence that the
plaintiff was a shady operator in fact. Silver, 373 U.S. at 364-66. A similar result would be
inappropriate in a peer-review case, because peer reviewers do not organize boycotts-as the
stock exchange had done in Silver in reliance upon a special statute, which the Court found
adequate to immunize only actions taken with procedural safeguards. See supra notes 36,
101.
103. The Court in Silver did not rule on the appropriate standard for reviewing substantive requirements, suggesting that it might be "a standard of arbitrariness, good faith, reasonableness, or some other measure." Silver, 373 U.S. at 366.
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propriate skepticism on the part of private decision makers. On balance, even though there is good reason to be concerned over the
homogenizing tendencies of peer reviewers' quality standards, it is
still difficult to make a case under antitrust law for judicial review
that goes beyond ascertaining that such standards have a rational
relationship to a procompetitive object.
Like the practice standards they adopt, the peer-reviewers' specific actions in particular cases should also be subjected only to limited scrutiny and upheld if not facially arbitrary or capricious. If
the procedures followed were fair and if the standards applied and
the record in the case reveal no obvious impropriety, antitrust challenges to such actions should be summarily dismissed. Even plausible allegations of anticompetitive animus should not be sufficient to
force a closer look. The recourse of those adversely affected must
be to the unrestrained marketplace and to the independent decision
makers whose judgments the peer reviewers seek to influence.'"
Indeed, it would be especially useful if courts would justify limited
scrutiny in these cases, not by acknowledging their deference to professionals as professionals, but by declaring that competitors in a
free market, whose conflict of interests disqualifies them from engaging in coercive self-regulation, are still entitled to combine to
publicize their possibly self-interested opinions and to advocate
their acceptance.
Undeniably, this legal approach would leave a residual danger
of abuse through inappropriate standards or selective enforcement.
A peer-review body that systematically harasses a subset of competitors for alleged quality deficiencies could probably, under the limited judicial scrutiny suggested, escape liability for a course of
conduct that was anticompetitive in both purpose and effect.' °5
This hazard could be addressed, however, by leaving room for pub104. To the extent that some competitors are disadvantaged by information and advice
published by a peer-review body, incentives are created for them to defend themselves by the
various lawful means available in a competitive market. They may lower their prices to attract attention, may publish their contrary views and evidence refuting the charges against
them, or may seek legislation recognizing their claims. In general, anything differentiating
some competitors from others, even if it does so unfairly, stimulates competitive activity
likely to benefit consumers. By the same token, a profession-dominated system that suppresses diversity and controversy may deny consumers desirable options.
105. See supra text accompanying note 96. In approving a PSRO's program of private
utilization and quality review, the FTC warned the proponents to "avoid any misuse of the
peer review program to discriminate against innovative competitors whose practice, though
legitimate and appropriate, may pose a competitive threat to other physicians involved in the
peer review program." Rhode Island Professional Standards Review Org., 101 F.T.C. 1010,
1011 (1983) (advisory opinion).
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lic enforcement agencies to initiate proceedings and to elicit proof of
unfair or deceptive standard setting or of systematic discrimination
against innovative or overly aggressive competitors. Federal Trade
Commission vigilance would seem to be a sufficient protection for
the public interest.1 1 6 Although cases brought by a public prosecutor technically stand on the same footing before a court as private
suits, it should be easy enough for a court to give the government
somewhat greater leeway in making its case in a peer-review challenge than it would give a private party. While doctrinally hard to
defend, the suggestion that private suits should be dismissed more
readily than public ones should not offend sensibilities once it is
conceded that antitrust law is primarily concerned with consumer,
not competitor, welfare.
In contrast, the alternative practice of giving private plaintiffs
every opportunity to try to prove their inevitable allegations of bias
and anticompetitive intent would be fraught with hazard. By raising subjective issues incapable of definitive proof, such an approach
would create uncertainties and liability risks that would chill peerreview efforts and the generation of procompetitive information and
opinion. For example, physician peer reviewers with strong and
sincere views with respect to the dangers of home births would be
open to the charge that they were only interested in driving midwives from the market. In such a case, a court would be faced with
the choice of either resolving the medical question-one that turns
in part on patient preferences and therefore has no definitive medical answer--or verifying the peer reviewers' good faith. But inviting a jury to find bad faith opens the door both to serious unfairness
and to findings of good faith that confer more legitimacy upon the
peer reviewers than they deserve.10 7 Under an antitrust regime that
aims to protect competition rather than competitors, the fact that
private actors, consulting their own interests, choose to honor the
peer reviewers' standards should be viewed as evidence of the peer
106. See supra note 105. By informal arrangement with the Department of Justice, the
FTC is more likely to take responsibility in this area. Its procedures and expertise equip it to
investigate allegations of abuse and selective enforcement. Because its remedies are prospective, respondents face only the costs of defending themselves, not monetary liability.
107. If allegations of bias received a hearing in private quality-assurance cases, physicians
singled out for deficiencies would always offer to prove the peer reviewers' anticompetitive
animus by showing the failings of other doctors undisciplined by the peer reviewers; opening
such issues would have costs far exceeding any benefits. In Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498
(9th Cir. 1986), a hearing lasting 17 sessions and 60 hours was required to allow a challenged
physician to question in turn the quality of care furnished by other doctors in the community.
See Brief for Appellant at 13.
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reviewers' trustworthiness, not as a basis for regulating the source
08
of information and opinion on which others freely rely.1
There is one type of antitrust case in which evidence of peer
reviewers' anticompetitive bias or selective enforcement against a
particular physician should probably be received-namely, a case
arising under section 2 of the Sherman Act and involving a legitimate allegation of monopolization or an attempt or conspiracy to
monopolize.' 0 9 Imposing special burdens directly on a competitor
is a generally recognized form of predatory conduct, " 0 and intent is
naturally a central issue in such cases. It is conceivable that a peerreview body might seek, through findings of quality deficiencies, to
exclude enough competitors to allow the remaining few to exercise
market power. For example, a single, dominant group practice in a
community might dominate the peer-review process so as to obtain
a monopoly by scrutinizing competing physicians so closely that
they would either find their market opportunities foreclosed or
choose to practice elsewhere. (Indeed, such a scenario is the essence
of the allegations in Patrick v. Burget, a much heralded case arising
in Astoria, Oregon."') Because a dangerous probability of actual
108. Great de facto influence wielded by a professional body is sometimes thought to
justify closer judicial scrutiny. Eg., Majorie Webster Jr. College v. Middle States Ass'n of
Colleges and Secondary Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965
(1970) (common-law case discussed in Havighurst & King, supra note 26, at 164-66). There
is reason to believe, however, that private users of information and opinion will reject biased
advice, thus providing protection against the apprehended abuses. See generally Havighurst
& King, supra note 26, at 189-201.
109. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). See generally E. GELLHORN, supra note 11, at 112-39.
110. Abuse of duly constituted legal process may be a basis for a monopolization charge.
See, e.g., California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972), discussed supra note 42. See also Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising
Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price(in press, 96 YALE L.J.).
111. Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498 (9th Cir. 1986). The plaintiff, who won a large
judgment in the trial court, was one of the few doctors in Astoria who was not a member of
the Astoria Clinic, and his exclusion might be regarded as an appropriate concern of an
antitrust court. The court of appeals remanded the case for further attention to the issues
surrounding the monopolization issues in the case. Id. at 1509.
The trial court result in this case has attracted a great deal of attention. See, e.g., Dolin,
supranote 1; Rust, supra note 3; Holoweiko, What Competition Can Do To Peer Review, Med.
Econ., Aug. 19, 1985, at 122. It also helped to trigger political concern that the entire peerreview enterprise may be jeopardized by antitrust threats. See infra text accompanying notes
132-36. This concern was somewhat misplaced, however, because the case involved an unusual market and a potential monopolistic situation, not usually found in such cases, that may
have required close antitrust scrutiny. The case could have been best handled by ensuring
that the hospital, rather than its doctors, was the ultimate arbiter of Dr. Patrick's right to
practice. See generally Havighurst, supra note 15, at 1116-22, 1125-39. This would have
meant dismissing the case because Patrick sued before the hospital ever had a chance to act
on his privileges. Unfortunately, the court of appeals reversed the trial court on a more
controversial ground. See infra note 136.
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monopoly over the delivery of services would have to be shown in
such cases, few of them are likely to arise. In any event, they raise
concerns quite distinct from those in cases challenging peer-review
efforts only as concerted action under section 1.
Despite the possibility that peer review will occasionally be less
than evenhanded and will burden some competitors unfairly, the
best policy for antitrust courts to follow in nonmonopolization cases
is to limit their scrutiny of properly conducted peer-review activities. If the peer reviewers are biased in fact, independent decision
makers will soon learn not to trust them and will look elsewhere for
guidance. This is the result most in keeping with the open competitive process that antitrust law seeks to foster. The alternative of
judicially regulating, and thus inhibiting, the generation of information in a chronically information-poor market should seem a distinctly poorer policy.
VII.

COMBATrING MONOPOLY IN THE MARKET FOR
INFORMATION

Unstated so far in this analysis of the antitrust status of professional peer review is a premise that, once elaborated, should alleviate residual concerns over the great influence exercised by some
professional peer-review bodies. Some observers will no doubt fear
that a laissez-faire policy, such as that recommended above, will
open the door to continued professional dominance and exclusion
from the marketplace of innovative or aggressively competitive
providers. Nevertheless, once the true source of such concerns is
identified, it is possible to suggest some further antitrust remedies
that, by addressing the root cause of the problem rather than its
symptoms, justify leaving properly run peer-review bodies free to
conduct their day-to-day business without undue legal risks. The
discussion here completes the picture of an antitrust regime that
both encourages the production of authoritative information and
opinion and preserves market opportunities for those providers who
1 12
may be at odds with majoritarian professional interests.
The key to the antitrust analysis here is a shift in focus away
from competition in markets for health services to another "relevant market" altogether-namely, the market for information and
opinion useful to those purchasing a particular type of health care
112. The analysis is similar to that presented at greater length in Havighurst & King,
supra note 26, at 264-325.
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or otherwise interested in its quality, appropriateness, and price." 3
From all that has been said above, it should be obvious how important it is that such information and opinion-often involving highly
debatable and complex technical and value-laden issues-be produced under competitive rather than monopolistic conditions. It is
desirable from a policy standpoint that such information and opinion be treated as articles of "trade or commerce" within the meaning of the Sherman Act; competition in their production could thus
be directly protected against monopolization and restraint. The
legal arguments which can be offered in support of such "relevant
markets" have been stated in another place 1 4 and will not be repeated here. It is possible, however, in concluding this Article to
suggest briefly how attending to the state of competition in the market for such information and opinion can alleviate any fears about
allowing profession-sponsored peer-review bodies to opine freelysubject only to the limitations outlined above-regarding professional fees, the utilization of services, and the quality of care rendered by individual providers.
The crucial points are: (1) that those interested in the answers
to difficult questions should be free to seek them from other sources,
and (2) that those with different ideas should be free to express
them. If professional bodies sponsoring peer-review efforts do nothing to monopolize the giving of advice or to restrain independent
parties from gathering data and acting upon their own impressions
and judgments, the competitive process remains operative and unrestrained. By analogy to section 2 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits monopolizing conduct but not a monopoly that is gained by
superior performance, it is of no legal consequence that a single lawful entity is the sole formal peer-review mechanism existing in an
area or that it exercises extraordinary influence over the choices
made by others. The important thing is that entry into the business
of advising purchashers of health care is not blocked by concerted
action and that the relevant decision makers are free to seek their
own counsel and to make their own choices.
These conditions of freedom of entry and action have not always
been satisfied in the health care marketplace. Indeed, history
reveals several illuminating instances of coerced acceptance by
health insurers of profession-sponsored peer review. For example,
in the early 1970's, Aetna Life and Casualty Company undertook to
113. See supra note 89.
114. See Havighurst & King, supra note 48, at 299-300.
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help its insureds resist lawsuits brought by physicians to recover
fees that the insurer regarded as excessive. Concerted professional
resistance to this practice included an AMA resolution disapproving it and opining that insurers should develop their reimbursement
policies only in consultation with organized medicine. As a result
of the outcry, Aetna met with AMA representatives and adopted
the following new policies:
3. When, following discussion with the physician, Aetna is unable to accept the full amount of a charge as within the range of
prevailing fees, it will ordinarily seek the advice of a peer review
committee or other review mechanism of the appropriate medical
society before finally determining its benefit payment ....
4. In any instance involving a question of types of treatments,
alternative types of services, or volume of services ordered or
provided, it is the policy of Aetna to make inquiry of the physician first and, if necessary, to seek supplemental advice through
peer review ....115
Many of the acts by which Aetna was coerced to accept professional
peer review appear to have constituted antitrust violations." 6 Evidence of similar efforts to force large purchasers to employ only
professionally approved cost-containment techniques also appeared
cases involving Michigan physicians11 7 and Indiin recent antitrust
118
ana dentists.
These experiences lend credence to the argument that prohibiting exclusionary practices that foster monopoly in markets for consumer-oriented technical information and opinion would leave
those markets competitive and open enough to allow professionsponsored peer review to function without close judicial oversight. 1 9 Although antitrust law has frequently been employed to
115. Goldberg & Greenberg, supra note 55, at 64-65.
116. Although boycotts are unlawful per se (supranote 36), an alternative way of viewing
these professional efforts would be as conduct aimed at monopolizing the provision of information and opinion.
117. See In re Michigan State Med. Soc'y, 101 F.T.C. 191, 267-75 (1983) (medical society
pressure on third-party payors regarding amount and manner of physician reimbursement).
118. See In re Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 101 F.T.C. 57, 102-06 (1983) (order prohibiting
dentists from organizing to restrict cooperation with third-party payor), vacated, 745 F.2d
1124 (7th Cir. 1984), rev'd, F.T.C. v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 106 S.Ct. 2009 (1986).; see
also In re Texas Dental Ass'n, 100 F.T.C. 536, 538 (1982) (complaint leading to consent
order).
119. Decisions concerning first amendment issues have emphasized the consuming public's interest in receiving information from more than one source. See supranote 44. Indeed,
the Supreme Court has permitted regulation limiting broadcasters' freedom in order to promote diversity in information sources. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367
(1969), the Court noted that "it is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to counte-
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regulate the conduct of firms occupying powerful market positions,
it is gradually being appreciated that antitrust attacks are more appropriately focused on maintaining competitive market conditions
so that private decision makers may operate without close regulatory supervision. 12 0 It seems entirely in keeping with sound antitrust policy for professional peer review that focuses on advice
giving and contributes to an open public debate over proper standards in medical care to be spared significant antitrust risks. Only
programs that are part of a professional effort to dominate the field
and to exercise control rather than influence should face serious difficulty in the antitrust courts.
VIII.

IMMUNITIES AND EXEMPTIONS FOR PEER REVIEWERS

The medical profession's fears of antitrust and other lawsuits by
practitioners injured by professional peer review has recently
prompted a series of new legislative proposals to shelter peer reviewers from litigation. Many of these measures have been offered
as a partial response to the alleged crisis in medical malpractice insurance, on the assumption that strengthening professional peer review would bring about needed improvements in the quality of care.
As this Article was being put into final form, Congress passed, and
the President signed, the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of
1986 (HCQIA). 2 1 One purpose of this act is to combat "the threat
of private money damage liability under Federal laws, including
treble damage liability under Federal antitrust law, [which] unreanance monopolization of that market ....
It is the right of the public to receive suitable
access to... ideas ... which is crucial .... " Id. at 390. The use of antitrust law to promote
diversity in the provision of information and advice concerning health services would seem
beneficial to consumers.
120. See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984). A
parent corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary were held not to be subject to suit under
§ 1 for conspiring with each other. The Court's opinion underscores the importance in antitrust analysis of identifying legitimate decision-making entities, which can be closely scrutinized only at the time of their formation or under the § 2 prohibition of monopolization. See
id. at 777. Such lawful entities should be protected thereafter against antitrust challenges to
their day-to-day business activities. The Court stated that the vice of concerted action is that
it "deprives the marketplace of the independent centers of decisionmaking that competition
assumes and demands." Id. at 769. Observing that the exemption of single entities from
scrutiny under § 1 leaves a " 'gap' in the Act's proscription against unreasonable restraint[s]," the Court said, "Congress left this 'gap' for eminently sound reasons. Subjecting a
single firm's every action to judicial scrutiny for reasonableness would threaten to discourage
the competitive enthusiasm that the antitrust laws seek to promote." Id. at 775. The analysis
in this Article extends this reasoning to provide a measure of comparable protection for
procompetitive joint action by physicians.
121. Pub. L. No. 99-660, §§ 401-32, - Stat. - (1986).
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sonably discourages physicians from participating in effective professional peer review." 2'
The approach to antitrust immunity taken in the HCQIA is unusual. The act leaves untouched the antitrust statutes as well as all
other legal doctrines under which an aggrieved physician might sue.
It proceeds instead by erecting special barriers to the bringing of
private suits for money damages under both federal law (other than
the civil rights acts) and state law (unless a state acts to reinstate its
remedies).123 Because the statute does not change antitrust law as
such, it does not directly affect the analysis in this Article. Nevertheless, the new hurdles that a plaintiff must now clear before getting to the antitrust merits in a peer-review case must be briefly
outlined to determine whether Congress may have gone too far in
sheltering conduct that may sometimes be harmful to the competitive process. It does not appear that Congress has done anything in
the HCQIA that significantly undermines the conceptual and legal
formulations provided herein.
Under the act, a plaintiff challenging a "professional review action" by a "professional review body," including a hospital, an alternative delivery system such as an HMO, or a professional
society, confronts a statutory presumption of reasonableness and
procedural regularity. Unless that presumption is rebutted by "a
preponderance of the evidence,""2 4 everyone participating in or assisting in the action qualifies for statutory immunity. Because there
are numerous factual issues that can be raised by a plaintiff to contest immunity, however, the new act does more to complicate than
to simplify litigation in this area. Nevertheless, the approach chosen may serve to deter some lawsuits. Not only may some prospective plaintiffs be daunted by the additional burdens of proof they
must bear, but the statute raises the plaintiff's stakes in the litigation by a fee-shifting provision. Under this provision, the plaintiff
will be liable for a defendant's reasonable legal costs if the court
finds that his claim was "frivolous, unreasonable, without foundation, or in bad faith."12' 5 These provisions make it both harder for a
plaintiff to prevail and potentially more costly to lose. If it is true,
122. Id. at § 402(4). The act also provides for a central clearinghouse to receive and
make available to designated persons reports of actions adversely affecting individual physicians' hospital privileges, of payments made in settling malpractice claims, and of disciplinary
actions taken by state licensing boards. Id. at §§ 421-27.
123. It preserves the power of state attorneys general, acting as parenspatriae, to bring
damage actiosn under § 4C of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15C (1982).
124. Section 412(a).
125. Section 413.
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as some believe, that physicians sometimes challenge unfavorable
peer-review actions with little hope of winning but for vindictive
purposes or in order to gain a strategic advantage for further negotiations, then these provisions may have the desired effect of fostering
oversight of practitioners by their professional peers.
For present purposes, it is notable that the new legislation has
no bearing on peer review of fees or utilization for cost-containment
purposes, extending its immunity only to actions taken "in the reasonable belief that the action was in furtherance of quality health
care." 12 6 The main focus of the act is on physician self-scrutiny
that occurs in hospitals, in medical group practices, and in medical
societies, contexts that are distinguishable from the communitywide, information-giving peer-review bodies that are the main focus
of this Article. Nevertheless, the statute defines a "health care entity" in such a way that a PRO or other free-standing, advisory
peer-review body could qualify for immunity under it when engaged
in quality-oriented peer review. 127
Perhaps the greatest flaw in the HCQIA is its failure fully to
observe and preserve the distinction, stressed in this Article, between purely advisory peer review and peer review that is coupled
with sanctions. Thus, a hospital medical staff that has effectively
seized authority over clinical privileges from the governing board 2 8
and a dominant medical society that prescribes and enforces standards of conduct for its members 2 9 can qualify for antitrust immunity under the statute's terms. To protect against possible abuses,
however, the act specifies that immunity attaches only to actions
that are "based on the competence and professional conduct of an
individual physician (which conduct affects (or may affect) adversely the health or welfare of a patient or patients)."' 30 Moreover, it goes on to specify further that immunity does not extend to
actions disciplining a physician for certain affiliations or associations, for advertising, for price cutting or other competitive acts, or
for relationships with other types of health care personnel. 3 1 It
126. Section 412(a)(1).
127. Section 431(4)(A)(iii).
128. See generally Havighurst, supra note 15.
129. See supra note 26; infra note 131.
130. Section 431(9).
131. Section 431(9). These provisions were apparently inserted at the insistence of the
FTC. Whether they block all opportunities for abuse is an interesting question. For example,
could a medical society, invoking quality-of-care concerns, expel a member for "unethically"
cooperating with a health insurer's requirement that X-rays or other documentation be submitted in advance to justify a patient's elective hospitalization? Cf FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of
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would appear that these provisions create some new opportunities
for litigating at length the true motives of the peer reviewers. Because many potential plaintiffs may perceive that the actions against
them fall within these exceptions, the threat of lawsuits may not be
reduced as much as the sponsors of the bill hoped.
An initial question raised by the HCQIA is whether legislative
protection of peer reviewers against antitrust and other lawsuits was
really necessary. Statutes already in place provided some immunity
for peer reviewers. Thus, the legislation establishing PROs confers
immunity from criminal and civil liability on individuals carrying
out PRO activities and those providing information to PROs; the
PRO itself is not exempted, however, nor is any sponsoring organization.1 32 State statutes also frequently provide protections to peerreview participants,1 33 but these statutes have been construed not to
displace federal antitrust oversight. 134 Although two states' authorization and supervision of hospital-based peer review have been
deemed sufficient to support a state-action exemption from the antitrust laws, 135 these holdings promise little relief because, in addition
to being unconvincing, they do not extend automatically to other
6
states.

13

Dentists, 106 S. Ct. 2009 (1986) (condemning dental society's agreement to similar effect).
The issue would appear to turn on whether the society's action amounts to condemning
"competitive acts intended to solicit or retain business." Consider also whether a medical
society could decide that providing a new, untested medical service was unethical and inconsistent with good-quality care. Cf Vest v. Waring, 565 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (society
challenged for questioning ethics of radial keratotomy, an innovative and profitable, but unproven treatment for nearsightedness); Schaschar v. American Acad. of Ophthalmology,
Inc., 1985-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,681 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (similar).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-6(a) (1982).
133. Eg., CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.7 (West 1982) (immunizing individuals engaged in peer
review, but not the sponsoring professional societies or hospitals, from monetary liability);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.40(3)(a) (West 1986) (immunizing members of "medical review committees"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2 § 151.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986) (immunizing hospitals and their staffs).
134. Memorial Hosp. of McHenry County v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058, 1063 (7th Cir.
1981) (construing a state law restricting the discoverability of peer-review records, the court
said "The public interest in private enforcement of federal antitrust law in this context is
simply too strong to permit the exclusion of relevant and possibly crucial evidence by application of the Hospital's privilege.").
If state laws hamper plaintiffs seeking to bring tort actions for defamation, unfair competition, or interference with contractual relations but do not affect federal antitrust actions,
claims of the latter type become more likely, strengthening the argument for federal action to
relieve pressure on peer reviewers.
135. See Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498 (9th Cir. 1986); Marrese v. Interqual, Inc., 748
F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3501 (1985).
136. For a persuasive critique of the ruling on the Indiana legislation, see Brief of the
FTC as Amicus Curiae, Lombardo v. Our Lady of Mercy Hosp., No. 85-2474 (7th Cir.
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The threat of antitrust actions against peer reviewers thus appears inadequately controlled by pre-HCQIA legislation. Moreover, state law preclusion of suits under common-law theories may
have caused federal antitrust suits to become even more popular in
recent years. In addition, the prospect of recovering treble damages
and attorneys' fees and the plaintiff's probable belief that he is the
victim of an anticompetitive conspiracy have also added to the attractiveness of antitrust actions by disadvantaged practitioners. In
fact, many suits have been filed, and many more have probably been
threatened.
A more fundamental question would appear to be the validity of
the HCQIA's apparent premise that antitrust law itself supplies inadequate deterrence to these suits. One serious problem is that defense costs are high, even if the suit is eventually won. Antitrust
actions in this area have most often been handled in ways that allow
many motions, extensive discovery, and lengthy trials. Most cases
inolve multiple parties, each of whom requires independent counsel.
In addition, physicians' liability and defense costs may not be covered by their malpractice insurance. Because plaintiffs know of
these burdens and may therefore be tempted to bring suits for strategic or vexatious purposes, it may be irrelevant that peer reviewers'
risk of actual liability in these cases is small. Recognition of the
high cost of defending against these challenges could easily inhibit
peer-review actions that would be in the best interest of consumers.
Such dilemmas are common in a legal system that, in addition to
being highly unpredictable, forces parties to bear their own litigation costs, win or lose. A strong argument could therefore be made
for more extensive, even automatic, fee shifting instead of the conditional fee shifting provided for in the HCQIA.
Although it may seem desirable to reduce the ability of marginal
practitioners to retaliate for legitimate actions taken against them,
the other horn of the legal system's dilemma is the risk that abusive
conduct will be inadequately policed if statutory immunities reduce
the threat of suit. The HCQIA's solution to this dilemma is not to
grant a complete exemption but to specify the conditions that must
1985). In Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498 (9th Cir. 1986), the court read the state law as
expressing a state policy inconsistent with federal law. But the state had done nothing more
than requrire~hospitals to control access to their medical staffs. Although antitrust law may
require hospitals not to let their medical staffs exclude competitors for their own reasons (see
Havighurst, supra note 15), it would generally support hospital policing of the quality of care
provided. There was no reason to think the state had any different policy or had provided (as
the state-action doctrine requires) supervision protective of consumers against anticompetitive abuses.
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be satisfied before the exemption may be invoked. Although hard
to criticize substantively, this approach may make litigation even
more complicated and costly and may in addition do a disservice to
antitrust law by implying that the courts employing traditional doctrine are incapable of reaching sound results in these cases on their
own; indeed, it may confirm the misinterpretations of the antitrust
statutes, criticized above, that stand in opposition to useful collective action. Because antitrust doctrine itself remains unaffected by
the new law, there is still a need for courts to shape that doctrine so
that entities that merely provide information to independent decisionmakers and entities that stand in a truly vertical relationship to
the plaintiff can have antitrust claims against them summarily dismissed without reference to the HCQIA. It would be ironic indeed
if the solution to the problem of vexatious and burdensome litigation against professional peer review were ultimately to be found in
antitrust principles themselves and not in the legislation that Congress devised specifically for the purpose.
The thesis of this Article is that the antitrust laws can readily be
interpreted and administered to encourage procompetitive concerted action while prohibiting peer-review programs that are structured or operated in ways truly incompatible with competition. If
the legal interpretations offered here were accepted and if peer reviewers tailored their conduct accordingly, courts could summarily
dismiss most antitrust suits brought against professional bodies engaged in peer review. The wisest congressional policy, therefore,
would have been simply to encourage antitrust courts to limit their
role to protecting the competitive process, rejecting the task of vindicating the supposed rights of competitors who claim to have been
hurt in that process. Unfortunately, the HCQIA fails to set antitrust doctrine straight, leaving the courts to learn for themselves
that their task is not to provide judicial review of peer-review actions but rather to make certain that the peer reviewers work
within, and do not displace, the decentralized, vigorously competitive system contemplated by antitrust policy.
IX.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE DOCTRINAL

ISSUES

The status of medical peer review under the federal antitrust
laws is important not only because it directly affects the nature and
aggressiveness of professional cost-containment and quality-assurance efforts, but also because it expresses in operational terms society's expectations of the organized medical profession. The
conclusion from the analysis in this Article is that profession-spon-
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sored peer reviewers should have an effective antitrust defense if
they confine themselves to defining norms, setting standards, and
making findings of compliance or noncompliance with those norms
and standards in particular cases. The crucial requirement is that
they act only in an advisory and not in a regulatory capacity, leaving to others the decision whether to comply with the peer reviewers' recommendations or to act upon the peer reviewers'
determinations of compliance or noncompliance.
Under the principles developed here, when a plaintiff complains
of the actions of a profession-sponsored peer-review body an antitrust court should limit itself to ascertaining two things:
(1) whether the peer-review effort was indeed procompetitive in its
essential features, and (2) whether the peer reviewers had a rational
basis related to their procompetitive mission for acting as they did
in the plaintiff's case. Such limited scrutiny can be exercised by the
court without a full trial investigating the plaintiff's performance
and the defendants' motives and behavior. Under this view of peerreview activities, most cases against peer reviewers could be summarily dismissed. If responsible professional groups can thus be spared
the risk of heavy litigation burdens, peer reviewers should be able
and willing to take actions in marginal cases that they are currently
reluctant to take. The public should ultimately benefit from more
aggressive peer review.
The legal conclusions reached here reflect both a recognition of
the procompetitive features of professional peer review and a rigorous insistence that peer review, properly conducted in a nonregulatory spirit, involves no restraint of trade even though it may
adversely affect some competitors. In an area such as health care,
where consumers lack good information and must rely upon lay or
professional intermediaries to help them make decisions, it is useful
for the medical profession, biased though it may be toward overvaluing its own norms and the services of its members, to make its
advice and standards publicly available. As long as consumers and
others are free to make as much or as little use of such advice and
standards as they choose, the competitive process continues to operate effectively. In such a competitive setting, the profession will
have an incentive to maintain its credibility by offering good advice.
Although the law now prevents physicians from exercising the collective control they once had over the provision and pricing of medical care, the medical profession can still speak for an honorable
tradition and important values. Consumers will benefit from both
the profession's authoritative guidance and their own freedom to
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reject that guidance when cost considerations or their own perceptions, preferences, or tastes incline them in a different direction.
The alternative to the style of antitrust analysis proposed here
for professional peer-review programs is a vague, motive-oriented
inquiry that seeks to ensure in each case that it was public and not
private interests that were being served.' 37 This approach, which is
similar to that employed in reviewing the work of public regulatory
bodies, generally muddies more than it clarifies. In particular, it
makes little distinction between harm to competitors and harm to
competition or between programs that give advice to independent,
noncolluding decision makers and programs that seek to enforce
their own judgments directly by organizing coercive boycotts or excluding nonconformists from valuable benefits and privileges.
Under motive-based approaches, the actions of the peer reviewers
are both attacked and defended using both "reasonableness" and
the general public interest as the operative standards.' 38 These tests
bear little resemblance, however, to the Rule of Reason, which
should focus exclusively on identifying net harm to competition and
should reject worthy-purpose defenses when such harm is found.
Fortunately, the essential-facilities doctrine offers helpful guidance
in structuring the inquiry in accordance with the Rule of Reason,
thus avoiding the implicit equation of professional bodies with public regulatory agencies.
X.

CONCLUSION

This Article is the third in a series of efforts to evaluate traditional forms of concerted action by medical and other professionals
in the light of antitrust theory. Here, as in the earlier studies of
private accrediting and credentialing programs 39 and of hospital
medical staffs,'" the conclusion reached is that the collective efforts
of professionals to provide technical advice and assistance to other
137. An exponent of this approach is Professor Kissam, who has recommended it in a
variety of contexts. See Kissam, Webber, Bigus & Holzgraefe, Antitrust and Hospital Privi-

leges: Testing the Conventional Wisdom, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 595 (1982); Kissam, Government
Policy Toward Medical Accreditation and Certification: The Antitrust Laws and Other
ProcompetitiveStrategies, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 1. Courts in staff privilege cases have found the
Kissam test to their liking. E.g., Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842 (W.D. Pa. 1981);
Hackett v. Metropolitan Gen. Hosp., 1982-83 Trade Cos. (CCH) - 65, 059 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1982). See the critique of this approach in Havighurst, supra note 15, at 1109-11, 1136-

39.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 37-47.
139. See Havighurst & King, supra note 48.

140. See Havighurst, supra note 15.
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participants in the health care marketplace are fundamentally
procompetitive and should therefore be viewed favorably by antitrust courts. With a proper appreciation of how such collective action can make information-poor markets function more efficiently,
there is no need for antitrust exemptions or for special antitrust
rules to facilitate these useful professional activities. Instead, it is
only necessary to apply antitrust law in an enlightened fashion, focusing on the benefits of information and advice to the competitive
process rather than on the impact of a certain action on specific
competitors. With this focus, it is of no special moment that a particular professional body influences independent decision makers to
prefer, or to avoid, a particular health care provider. Antitrust
courts should be actively concerned only when professional bodies
go beyond merely advising others and give direct effect to their
judgments by taking coercive action against deviating providers or
by inviting physicians collusively to abide by collective standards.
Actions aimed at monopolizing either the provision of particular
services or the business of setting and applying standards may also
occasionally be appropriate targets for antitrust action.
The views presented here have one important implication for
practitioners engaged in collective professional endeavors. Despite
their good intentions, even the most conscientious professionals
may face real antitrust dangers if they cling to traditional perceptions of their function in the health care marketplace. The antiquated idea that professionals are entitled to regulate themselvesthat is, actually control through agreements and coercive sanctions
the conduct of individual practitioners-must give way to a recognition that professional groups are expected by society to confine
themselves to being advocates before, and expert advisors to, independent public and private entities, which are the only legitimate
final decision makers in the health care sector. Although it will be
difficult for professionals to surrender their traditional powers, the
profession's new role is a respectable and important one. In the
American system, no single interest group should dominate a particular field of endeavor. Nevertheless, in a field so fraught with
uncertainty as health care, the American people are likely to place
continued faith in pronouncements of the medical community. It is
the duty of the medical profession, advocating its views in the open
marketplace of public opinion and ideas, not to abuse that public
trust. As long as consumers and those who act on their behalf remain free to accept or reject the authoritative advice thus offered,
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professionalism and competition can easily and productively
coexist.

